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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause: Local Discrimination
in Environmental Protection Regulation
Since the United States Supreme Court determined in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens" that the Constitution's grant to Congress of the
power to regulate commerce 2 did not necessarily exclude states from
exercising the same power,3 state regulation of commerce has been
subject to frequent and varying4 court scrutiny. In Hackensack
Meadowlands Development Commission v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Authority5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a New Jersey
statute banning in-state disposal of out-of-state solid waste6 did not
unconstitutionally infringe upon the congressional power to regulate
commerce. It is doubtful, however, that federal courts would agree
with this conclusion; and it is possible that this statute, although promulgated pursuant to the traditional police power vested in the states, is
unconstitutional despite the federal courts' willingness to uphold state
police power enactments undertaken in the field of environmental
protection. 7
1. 53 U.s. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
2. The commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. 53 U.S. at 318-20. Drawing an analogy between the power of taxation and
the power to regulate commerce, the Court observed that the existence of each respective
power in the Congress could be compatible with the existence of a similar power in the
states and that the states could legislate in the commerce area unless such action conflicted with congressional legislation or with a necessary uniformity in the regulation of
any one subject matter within the field of commerce. Id.
4. The apparent inconsistency in Supreme Court adjudication of cases arising
under the commerce clause can be ascribed to two factors: (1) the difficulty in determining the exact meaning and scope of a congressional act in the commerce field, as
discussed by the Court in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), and (2) the
different tests that the Court has applied at any one time to state regulations challenged
on commerce clause grounds. See text accompanying notes 24 & 28 infra.
5. 68 N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 96 S. Ct. 1504 (1976).
6. See note 8 infra.
7. The New Jersey Supreme Court cited several recent decisions in both federal
arid state forums that sustained environmental protection statutes against commerce
clause attack. 68 N.J. at 476, 348 A.2d at 518. See note 40 infra.
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New Jersey originally forbade disposal of out-of-state waste within
the Hackensack Meadowlands District and later extended the ban to

cover the entire state.8 The state agencies implementing the ban, the
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission (HMDC) and the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), brought suit to enjoin
the Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority (MSLA) from accepting for
disposal in its landfill site within the Hackensack Meadowlands District
any solid wastes originating or collected outside of New Jersey.0

Defendants'

°

challenged the constitutionality of the agencies' regula-

tions and the authorizing statute on the grounds that the Waste Control

Act and several of the -MDC regulations were arbitrary and unreasonable and that they violated both the commerce clause and the privileges

and immunities clause; defendants further contended that the proce8. The Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act called for
the orderly development of the Meadowlands and special provisions for solid waste disposal there. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (West Supp. 1976). At the time
the state sought development of the area, not merely its preservation, for the objective
was "to reclaim, plan, develop and redevelop the Hackensack meadowlands." Id. §
13:17-1. The Legislature thereafter passed a Solid Waste Management Act designed to
achieve safe and effective disposal of solid waste throughout New Jersey. N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13:lE-1 to -37 (West Supp. 1976). Ultimately, the Legislature, after finding that solid waste posed a grave threat to the quality of the state's environment, enacted the Waste Control Act, which in its final form empowered the commissioner of
the State Department of Environmental Protection to regulate or ban disposal within
New Jersey of out-of-state solid waste. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:11-1 to -10 (West
Supp. 1976). The section of the statute establishing the ban provides:
The Legislature finds and determines that . . . the volume of solid and
liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal of
these wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of the environment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate land fill sites
within the State are being diminished, that the environment continues to be
threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste which originated or was collected outside the State and that the public health, safety and welfare require
that the treatment and disposal within this State of all wastes generated outside
of the State be prohibited.
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State . . . until
the commissioner [of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such
action can be permitted without endangering the public health, safety and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment
and disposal of such waste in this State. Any person violating this provision
shall be subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions of the "Waste Control Act."
Id. §§ 13:11-9, -10. Both the Department of Environmental Protection and the
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission promulgated regulations towards
this end. NJ. ADMIN. CODE 7:1-4.2 (1974); N.J. ADMiN. CODE, 19:7-1.1 (1973).
9. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (Ch. 1974).
10. The MSLA is a joint venture wholly owned and operated by other named defendants. The City of Yonkers, New York, whose refuse was being deposited on the
MSLA site within the Hackensack Meadowlands District, moved for and was granted
leave to intervene as a party defendant. Id. at 163, 316 A.2d at 712.
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dures adopted by the DEP in promulgating its rule violated due
process."'
Upholding only defendants' commerce clause claims, 2 the Superior Court of New Jersey found that "[a]lthough the State's objective
in attempting to conserve a local natural resource for local needs is a

proper police power purpose, that [objective] cannot be accomplished
by discrimination based on the source of the refuse."' 3

Accordingly,

the exclusion of out-of-state solid waste from deposit within the
Hackensack Meadowlands District was declared unconstitutional.' 4

Subsequently the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification in
Hackensack 5 and contemporaneously brought forward for argument
and disposition' 6 a suit by the City of Philadelphia against New Jersey
in which New Jersey's state-wide ban on out-of-state solid waste was
declared unconstitutional as effecting an improper discrimination against

interstate commerce.
11. Id. at 163, 316 A.2d at 712. The privileges and immunities clause provides:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
12. The court found that the promulgation of the regulations was not arbitrary, nor
did it contravene the enabling act under which the regulations were developed, the Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act. See note 8 supra. The failure
to hold a hearing prior to adoption of the DEP rule was found not to have denied defendants due process, inasmuch as no hearing was required by statute or constitution.
The court also determined that defendants did not vigorously advance their argument
with respect to the privileges and immunities clause and that, regardless of this, there
were serious infirmities in that position. 127 N.J. Super. at 167-69, 316 A.2d at 713-15.
13. Id. at 174, 316 A.2d at 718.
14. While discussing the validity of the state's action as an exercise of the police
power, the court observed that the regulations then under attack did not prohibit disposal
of out-of-state solid waste throughout New Jersey, but only banned its disposal within
the Hackensack Meadowlands District. Questioning whether such a limited ban could
be considered a measure undertaken to protect the public health of the state, the court
added, in a footnote, that newly enacted sections 9 and 10 of the Solid Waste Act
(quoted in note 8 supra) and the new DEP regulation promulgated thereunder might
render its decision moot by establishing a state-wide ban against the importation of at
least some forms of solid waste. Id. at 170 n.1, 316 A.2d at 716 n.1. The widening
of the application of the ban, however, did not affect the grounds upon which the decision of the superior court rested, since the regulations were delcared unconstitutional not
as an improper or unnecessary exertion of the police power but for discriminating
against New Jersey's sister states. Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, while
noting the change the DEP regulation underwent, did not otherwise deal with the issue
of the scope of the ban in its discussion of the statute's validity as an exercise under
the police power. 68 N.J. at 457 n.2, 348 A.2d at 508 n.2.
15. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
66 N.J. 337, 331 A.2d 37 (1974). During this time the judgment of the superior court
had been stayed.
16. City of Philadelphia v. State, 67 N.J. 102, 335 A.2d 55 (1974).
17. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
68 N.J. 451, 459, 348 A.2d 505, 509 (1975), prob. jurls, noted sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 96 S.Ct. 1504 (1976).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court in Hackensack determined that
the disputed solid waste did in fact constitute articles of commerce
within the meaning of the commerce clause,' and found that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power' 9 in an area that
Congress had not preempted.20 In disagreement with the lower courts,
the supreme court ruled that the New Jersey Waste Act did not discriminate unconstitutionally against sister states. 2 ' Declaring that the
statute would be valid if the burden it imposed on interstate commerce

did not outweigh its benefit to the state, the court found that the statute imposed only a "slight" burden on commerce 22 and held that the
statute's aim was "crucial to the welfare" of the state. 23 As a result
of this balancing the court reversed the judgments of the lower courts
and sustained the state's actions.

Whether this particular exercise of the police power to achieve
environmental protection would successfully withstand a challenge in
the federal courts depends upon the "balancing test" applicable in a
commerce clause review.24 As the New Jersey court observed, the
18. Id. at 468-69, 348 A.2d at 514. The lower court in Hackensack had not explicitly stated that solid waste constituted an article of commerce within the commerce
clause. See 127 N.J. Super. at 169-70, 316 A.2d at 716. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey, however, relying on United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 242
F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 961 (1966), determined that the disposal of the solid waste, regardless of the conjectural value of the waste itself, constituted interstate commerce. 68 N.J. at 468-69,
348 A.2d at 514. The holding in Pennsylvania Refuse was particularly pertinent to the
Hackensack situation since in the former case it was determined that "refuse transported
from Pennsylvania to New Jersey and disposed of in the latter state . . . was plainly
a proper subject of interstate commerce." 357 F.2d at 808.
19. 68 NJ. at 472, 348 A.2d at 516.
20. Id. at 471, 348 A.2d at 515.
21. Id. at 477, 348 A.2d at 518.
22. Id. at 475, 348 A.2d at 517-18.
23. Id. at 478, 348 A.2d at 519.
24. The balancing test juxtaposes the burden(s) on interstate commerce flowing
from the challenged provision with the benefit(s) to the state derived therefrom. The
most recent enunciation of the balancing test by the United States Supreme Court is to
be found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), in which the Court stated:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that
emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142. Opposed to this somewhat hesitant espousal of the balancing test is another
Court decision, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. &
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commerce clause test applied to state actions has not been uniform.
This disparity is in part a result of

Cooley,2"

5

the first United States

Supreme Court decision to apply a commerce clause test, in which the
Court restricted its holding to the facts and declined to articulate a general doctrine for future guidance." Uncertainty is evident in many com-

merce clause cases, 28 particularly in those like Hackensack that deal
with state environmental protection statutes.2 9 Yet despite divergence

in approach by federal and state courts on the issue of environmental
regulation the cases uniformly hold that no state action can survive a

commerce clause analysis if its effect on interstate commerce is heavily
burdensome or if it discriminates against interstate commerce.30
It is clear that the New Jersey court was correct in its decision that

the area of solid waste disposal was not preempted by Congress, 3 ' and
P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968). Upholding the validity of an Arkansas "full-crew" law
that required a minimum train crew under certain conditions of railroad operations in
the state, the Court strongly implied that such a test, if utilized at all, was to be applied
only by another governmental body: "The question of safety in the circumstances of
this case is essentially a matter of public policy, and public policy can, under our constitutional system, be fixed only by the people acting through their elected representatives."
Id. at 138. The Court then noted its doubt as to whether in such a case any balancing
test at all could be appropriate: "It is difficult at best to say that financial losses should
be balanced against the loss of lives and limbs of workers and people using the highways." Id. at 140.
25. 68 N.J. at 473, 348 A.2d at 516.
26. See text accompanying notes 1-3 and note 3 supra.
27. See 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 320.
28. See Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975). In that case a federal appeals judge, after noting that "[c]lassifying the Supreme Court's commerce clause
adjudications for the purpose of analytical application may seem to many an exercise
in futility," attempted to devise his own categories in order to determine whether the
statute there under challenge transgressed the federal plenary power under the commerce
clause. Id. at 45.
29. The balancing test as applied in Pike and prior decisions is severely criticized
in Note, Use of the Commerce Clause to Invalidate Anti-Phosphate Legislation: Will
It Wash?, 45 U. CoLo. L. REv. 487 (1974). This Note cites Professor David Engdahl
as a recent commentator on the history of the commerce clause who urges abandonment
of the balancing test in cases arising under the clause. The Note refers to Engdahl as
taking "the position that if the . . . balancing test is reached, a court should make a
presumption in favor of the validity of the legislation." Id. at 493. The failure, however, to apply such a test by two Oregon state courts reviewing the constitutionality of
the Oregon Minimum Deposit Act, see text accompanying note 41 infra, was criticized
in Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1762 (1974). Tracing the history of the balancing test to its current
form in Pike, the Note concludes: "Thus, it appears to be the duty of the courts to balance the harms and benefits of the state's environmental legislation." Id. at 1778.
30. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), discussed in note 24
supra.
31. The preemption test as applied in the field of interstate commerce was set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc, v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963):
The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation
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in its finding that the New Jersey provisions were a valid exercise of

the state's police power, especially in light of the extensive scope of
that power as recognized by the Supreme Court.12 Nonetheless, the
Hackensack court erred in upholding the validity of the state's solid

waste ban; a comparison of Hackensack with cases in the environmental
protection field reveals that the Waste Control Act, contrary to the New

Jersey court's conclusions, discriminates against interstate commerce and
significantly burdens the flow of that commerce without providing comparable benefit to the state.

The commerce clause standards that

environmental regulations must satisfy were articulated in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,38 the leading decision of the United

States Supreme Court in which an environmental protection provision
was juxtaposed with the federal interest of ensuring unimpeded interstate commerce.

In upholding Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code as a

valid exercise of the traditional police power 34 the Court in Huron set
forth the controlling principle in cases of this nature: "Even-handed
local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid
unless pre-empted by federal action . . . or unduly burdensome on

. . . interstate commerce. 5 Under this broad statement of principle
the New Jersey Waste Act might well be found, in a more neutral forum,
to constitute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
Although the Detroit code in Huron resulted in a noticeable
impact on at least some elements of interstate commerce,

6

it imposed

its requirements in a manner that was "even-handed"; that is, the regulations were "applicable alike to 'any person, firm or corporation' within
the city," as well as to those without."

By contrast the New Jersey

of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.
Id. at 142. The most recent congressional statement in this particular area, the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3259 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) declares that, despite the nationwide gravity of the solid waste problem, "the collection and disposal of
solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local
agencies . . . ." Id.§ 3251(a)(6). This recognition of the primacy of the states in
the field of solid waste disposal defeats any presumption of federal preemption. For
a further discussion of this issue, see Note, 87 HARv. L. REv., supra note 29, at 1770-72
(1974).
32. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
33. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
34. Id. at 442.
35. Id. at 443.
36.. "Structural alterations [to the ships of appellant] would be required in order
to insure compliance with the Code." Id. at 441.
37. Id. at 448.
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provisions are aimed solely at out-of-state waste. The New Jersey
court declared there had been no discrimination, at least in an economic
sense, because out-of-state refuse collectors could continue to collect
and dispose of solid waste within the state if the refuse originated within
New Jersey.38 This observation does not adequately dispose of the discrimination issue, however, especially since the court found that solid
waste did constitute an article of commerce within the commerce
clause. 3 9 To restrict the service of waste disposal to only those generating solid waste within New Jersey clearly discriminates against non-

New Jersey interests since the service of refuse disposal constitutes
commerce not only for the disposal agents but also for those whose solid
waste is removed. Therefore it is clear that the New Jersey Waste
Act's discriminatory impact distinguishes this statute from provisions
upheld in Huron as well as provisions upheld in other cases utilized by

the New Jersey court as supportive authority, thereby rendering the
New Jersey laws voidable under the commerce clause standards applied

by the Supreme Court in Huron.4"
38. 68 N.J. at 475, 348 A.2d at 517.
39. See text accompanyfng note 18 supra.
40. According to the Huron standards, only that "[s]tate regulation, based on the
police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand." 362 U.S. at 448 (emphasis
added). In Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976), the Huron principle controlled the outcome
with respect to the commerce clause attack maintained by appellant. Id. at 909. Another case cited by the Hackensack court as supportive of its decision, Portland Pipe
Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973), upheld a Maine provision against a commerce clause
challenge because the court found that its impact, if any, on interstate commerce was
non-discriminatory and even-handed, as required by Huron. Id. at 40. In that case the
validity of a tax on the transfer of oil over water in Maine was sustained because it
was levied on oil transferred intrastate as well as on oil traveling through interstate and
foreign channels. In contrast the New Jersey Act not only discriminates against interstate commerce but bans rather than merely regulates the importation of material from
other states into New Jersey, in essence prohibiting the flow of that element of interstate
commerce. As to this issue see text accompanying notes 52-66 infra. Procter & Gamble
Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), is
also clearly distinguishable from Hackensack. In Procter& Gamble a modified balancing test was applied to demonstrate that a Chicago ordinance banning the sale of any
detergent containing phosphates did not unconstitutionally burden the flow of interstate
commerce and could therefore be readily upheld as a reasonable means of achieving a
legitimate legislative aim. The Chicago ordinance differed from the New Jersey Waste
Act since, designed to prevent the growth of nuisance algae in the Illinois Waterway,
the ordinance applied a non-discriminatory ban against the entry into the city (and thus
into the city's portion of the Waterway) of any phosphate detergent. To be fully analogous to the Chicago ordinance the New Jersey statute would have to ban the disposal
of all solid waste in the imperiled areas. Since there were "no discriminatory aspects
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If subjected to the exhaustive commerce clause analysis set forth
in American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission41 the New

Jersey act would be unconstitutional under criteria other than a test of
discriminatory intent. In American Can the Oregon court determined
that the increased costs arising from the state provision under attack
were borne by all affected industries without regard to state lines. 42 In

obvious contrast to the Oregon approach, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ignored the extent of consequential economic discrimination
against non-New Jersey groups who benefit from the transfer of waste
to New Jersey.4" Although economic discrimination is a relatively
remote effect of the New Jersey statute, it could result in invalidation
of the New Jersey Waste Control Act were a court to explore in detail
the economic burdens and benefits flowing from the act and apply to

its economic findings the balancing test required in a full commerce
clause review.

The Hackensack decision is also vulnerable to close review
because it fails properly to refute objections that the act intentionally
discriminates against other states-objections that are based primarily
on what may be termed the "natural resources cases ' 44 cited by the
lower court in Hackensack. At issue in those cases was the validity
of provisions regulating natural gas or petroleum that had the effect of
retaining the resource within the producing states. The regulations were
associated with this purpose [the elimination of nuisance algae] that might invalidate it,"
the Procter & Gamble court found that the purpose and the Chicago ordinance promoting it were not unconstitutional. 509 F.2d at 80. Confronted with the discriminatory
aspects of the New Jersey act-which protects only New Jersey's interests, by banning
only non-New Jersey solid waste-it is questionable whether the Procter & Gamble
court would arrive at the same conclusion.
41. 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973). This decision upheld the constitutionality of the Oregon Minimum Deposit Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 45.810-.890 (1975), which
requires that all beverage containers sold in Oregon be accepted for reuse by distributors
and bottlers, and which enacted a ban on pull-top cans.
42. 15 Or. App. at 642, 517 P.2d at 703. See Note, 87 HARV. L. REV., supra note
29, at 1783, which further analyzes the economic burdens borne by the State of Oregon,
its citizens, and the various facets of the industry as a result of the act and concludes,
inter alia, that the deposit imposes no real handicap on the industry and that the larger
portion of the economic burden is internalized and thus bome ultimately by the consumers of the beverages under regulation.
43. The New Jersey statute would lead to an immediate increase in solid waste disposal costs for the litigant cities in Hackensack. 68 N.J. at 476, 348 A.2d at 518. It
is obvious that such a burden, however "small" or "modest" the Hackensack court characterized it, would not be borne by any New Jersey interests associated with either the
generation or disposal of solid wate in the state.
44. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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invariably defended, as in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,45 as "exercise[s] of the police power to conserve the natural resources of the
state,"'46 but the Supreme Court in West ruled such resource conservation was really designed only to serve "the business welfare" of the producing state, and if adopted by each state would unconstitutionally
"halt . . commerce at state lines." 47 The New Jersey Supreme Court
found this reasoning inapplicable to the New Jersey Waste Act because
of the distinction it discovered between the basic state purposes of the
West regulations on the one hand and those of the New Jersey act on
the other: the distinction between an effort "to preserve and exploit
a [natural] resource for selfish economic and commercial gain" and
an attempt "to protect the health of its citizens and4 8 give some measure
of precarious protection to its natural environment.1
There nevertheless exists a greater degree of similarity between
the two types of state action than the New Jersey court chose to recognize. The original and primary goal of the New Jersey provisions was
development, not mere conservation, of the disposal areas. 49 Admittedly the promotion of the wise and productive development of land
is a legitimate aim of the police power, but however important and
worthwhile the commercial and industrial development of the Hackensack Meadowlands and other landfill sites may be to New Jersey, the
promotion of this activity does not constitute health or environmental
preservation and cannot successfully be defended as a measure undertaken to achieve either goal.50 Rather it might be appropriate at this
juncture for courts to recognize that in an area as heavily populated as
the Northeast Corridor landfill sites and open land of any sort are as
valuable a natural resource and economic commodity as gas or oil continue to be. Discriminatory measures designed to prevent utilization of
this resource by other states, typified by the New Jersey Waste Act, may
therefore be subject to the limiting doctrine set forth in West.51
45. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
46. Id. at 249.
47. Id. at 255.
48. 68 N.J. at 477, 348 A.2d at 518.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in Hackensack, "garbage and
refuse do provide a great threat to the public health." 68 NJ. at 472, 348 A.2d at 516
(citing Shaw v. Township of Byram, 86 NJ. Super. 598, 602, 207 A.2d 570, 572, cert.
denied, 45 NJ. 35, 210 A.2d 780 (1965)). The Shaw decision, however, concerned the
open dumping of garbage, which presumably involved a far greater degree of risk to the
public health than does sanitary landfill (which is by definition a less hazardous operation), the mode of solid waste disposal adopted in the Hackensack Meadowlands District and other areas in the state.
51. A more recent Supreme Court decision has held that state fixing of natural gas
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Finally, the fact that New Jersey chose the extreme recourse of
a ban to achieve its purpose subjects the Waste Control Act to a high
degree of judicial scrutiny and, accordingly, a high risk of invalidation. "
Not all outright bans of a given material in commerce are unconstitu-

tional; 53 however, such prohibitions are inevitably reviewed with great
assiduity to ensure that they do not "interfere with transportation into
or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its selfprotection.. . . The Police power of a State cannot obstruct foreign
commerce or interstate commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise
... ."1 The constitutionality of a total ban must be conditioned on its
wellhead prices is permissible within the commerce clause as a legitimate effort to conserve valuable natural resources. Cities Serv. Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S.
179 (1950). The measure was upheld because Oklahoma was "justifiably concerned
with preventing rapid and uneconomic dissipation of one of its chief natural resources."
Id. at 187. The Court noted, however, that there were limits to the ways in which a
state might respond to such a concern, limits that might be of some pertinence to Hackensack. "The only requirements consistently recognized have been that the regulation
not discriminate or place an embargo on interstate commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local interest at stake outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the prevention of state restrictions." Id. at 186-87 (emphasis
added). Such limitations apparently led to the invalidation of a Texas statute that forbade the exportation of well water to other states without specific legislative approval.
City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35
(1966). In that case the court noted critically that contrary to the avowed purpose of
the statute it did not "operate to conserve water resources of the State of Texas except
in the sense that it [did] so for her own benefit to the detriment of her sister States
as in the case of West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co." Id. at 839-40. The Texas statute,
like the New Jersey act, prohibited only out-of-state interests from utilizing the protected
natural resource (well water and landfill sites, respectively) while "indulging in the substantial discrimination" of allowing the prohibited activity to be carried on by those
within the state. Id. at 840. In placing a discriminatory embargo on interstate transportation of the unique natural and environmental resource of water the Texas statute
was thus clearly unconstitutional under West; it is likely that the New Jersey Waste Control Act, by enacting a ban on out-of-state use of a like resource, is similarly invalid.
52. See, e.g., Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n,
307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973). The court upheld the validity of the Maine provision taxing oil transference because, in part, the statute did not
prohibit that aspect of interstate commerce but instead merely undertook to regulate it so
as to alleviate the effects of the peril of oil spills. Id. at 37.
53. State power to regulate traffic in intoxicating liquor represents one well-recognized exception to the federal plenary powers under the commerce clause. See National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Miller, 358 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Kan.), afj'd, 414 U.S. 948
(1973). Additional areas in which pervasive state regulation is permitted are discussed
in Note, 87 HARV. L. REv., supra note 29, at 1784. Because of the deference accorded
to the states, discriminatory regulations in the commerce of firearms or firecrackers, for
example, are not likely to be reversed. But see Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry., 125
U.S. 465 (1888), in which the Court held unconstitutional an Iowa law banning the importation (as opposed to the mere sale) of intoxicating liquor.
54. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472-74 (1877), quoted in Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 491-92 (emphasis added).
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being found nondiscriminatory.55

Unless shown to be essential to the

protection of public health the discriminatory aspects of New Jersey's
waste control measures expose the provisions to constitutional attack

as impermissible prohibitions on articles within interstate commerce.
It appears that the New Jersey court's decision in Hackensack
failed to resolve the commerce clause difficulties raised by the statute.

The act apparently does not encroach upon an area preempted by the
federal government,5 7 but it is doubtful that the New Jersey program
provides the type of solution for the solid waste disposal problem that

Congress envisaged.

Consequently, the act might be regarded with

disfavor in a federal forum because it fails to coincide with the general

direction of federal policy.58 In addition, were the balancing test to
be applied by a federal court similar to the one applied in American
55. See, e.g., Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946). This case upheld the
constitutionality of California provisions excluding insurance brokers and agents from
doing business within California if they did not satisfy reserve requirements set forth
by the state. The Court declared in the determinative part of its opinion: "Exclusion
there is, but it is exclusion of what the State has the power to keep out, until Congress
speaks otherwise." Id. at 459. It sustained the validity of the reserve requirements,
finding that they "cannot be held, either on the face of the statute or by any showing
that has been made, to be. . . designed or effective either to discriminate against foreign
or interstate insurers or to forbid or exclude their activities. . . ." Id.
56. Compare Hackensack with Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiam, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983
(1971), which upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute banning the importation and sale of certain wild animal products in New York. Although the New Jersey
Waste Act is, like the Palladio provision, an exercise of the police power undertaken
in an area not preempted by Congress, the New Jersey statute is not so neutral and evenhanded in its prohibition. The New York ban was not established to protect or in any
way facilitate the state's control of animals native to or otherwise within New York,
nor was New York attempting to provide some shield to producers of such products
within the state. The New York ban did not distinguish among the animals themselves
or the products obtained from them by state or national origin; the New Jersey statute,
on the other hand, makes that distinction and does so in order to facilitate the state's
disposal of its solid waste and to promote other state interests. Although these interests
may be as worthy of protection as those New York sought to promote, the discrimination
between New Jersey and non-New Jersey articles is not duplicated in the New York statute. Accordingly, subjected to commerce clause scrutiny, the New Jersey ban, thus distinguishable, may not meet with the same success as the New York statute reviewed in
Palladio.
57. See note 31 and text accompanying note 20 supra.
58. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was empowered by the Solid
Waste Disposal Act to "encourage the enactment of improved and, so far as practicable,
uniform State and local laws governing solid-waste disposal." 42 U.S.C. § 3254 (1970).
Although at least one state, Maine, has adopted a statute similar in purpose and effect
to the New Jersey Solid Waste Control Act, ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17, § 2253 (1976), New
Jersey's neighboring states of Pennsylvania, New York and Delaware have not. Thus,
the New Jersey statute, though not intrusive on a federally preempted field, obstructs
the uniformity Congress desires to achieve in that area.
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Can59 the Waste Act and its attendant regulations could be held to have
engendered an impermissible economic impact on the flow of interstate
commerce. In a case such as Hackensack it is possible that the balancing test can properly be applied only by a federal court, for in the
presence of outright discrimination occurring at the state boundaries the
ability of the state courts to apply the test in a proficient and neutral
manner may be limited.
The Hackensack court described in detail the "crisis proportions"
that the solid waste problem had reached in New Jersey 0 and it is
undeniable that New Jersey does have the right to undertake appropriate measures to deal with this pressing environmental concern. However, even if the Waste Control Act did not raise troublesome constitutional questions New Jersey would eventually have to adopt alternative
methods of solving the state's waste disposal problem, for it is apparent
that the New Jersey Waste Act only alleviates the situation on a
temporary basis. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, the ban
on in-state disposal of solid waste originating outside the state would
lengthen the lifespan of existing New Jersey landfill sites by a mere
eight percent. 61 Therefore, although the statute was enacted to prevent "further virgin wetlands or other undeveloped lands from being
' it seems that the prohibition would at
devoted to landfill purposes," 62
best only delay for a short time the conversion of such areas into landfill sites. The statute's long-term benefit to the state is minisculeand compared to the discriminatory burden cast on the flow of interstate commerce and the resulting negative repercussions to out-of-state
interests it is doubtful that the statute could survive any thorough application of the balancing test in a federal forum.
Hackensack accentuates the need for a federal uniform approach
to the problem, 3 but it is unlikely that Congress will act toward this
59. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
60. 68 N.J. at 460-65, 348 A.2d at 509-12.
61. Id. at 461, 348 A.2d at 510. The court further found that as of January 1,
1974, sanitary landfills within the Hackensack Meadowlands would be usable for only
one year longer than expected if the ban were enacted. Prior to the enactment of the
ban it was estimated that all land presently committed to landfill operations would be
exhausted by 1982; extending the usefulness of those sites by eight percent would not
appreciably lengthen the period during which they could be used for disposal. Id. at
462 n.7, 348 A.2d at 510 n.7. New Jersey's solid waste could be disposed of in its neighboring states, but it is conceivable that, inspired or irked by New Jersey's Waste Act,
those states might pass reciprocal measures, foreclosing New Jersey from employing that
avenue.
62. Id. at 465, 348 A.2d at 512.
63. See Note, Control of Redeemable Solid Waste: A Proposed National Bill, 5
SuFoL L. REv.962 (1971).
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end. 64 However, the New Jersey Solid Waste Act and the Hackensack

decision upholding it may impel the federal courts toward the enunciation of a new statement on this statute and others that represent a challenge to the plenary federal commerce powers and toward the invali-

dation of any environmental protection provision that erects a
discriminatory barrier against other states.

The only other alternative

may be a beginning of the "ecological Balkanization" of this country
similar to "the intolerable experience of the economic Balkanization of
America that existed in the colonial period and under the Articles of

Confederation" 5 -the situation the commerce clause was designed to
eliminate.
IRA STEVEN LEFTON

Constitutional Law-:-Conditions of Confinement for

Administratively Segregated Prisoners
It is common for prisoners subjected to segregation or solitary
confinement to lose many privileges and rights accorded the general
inmate population.

The federal courts in recent years have often de-

fined and protected constitutional rights of inmates placed in segrega64. A bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 was introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1975 and was designed to oblige each state to adopt a statewide waste management and resource recovery program implementing, among other objectives: "(10) interstate co-operation in waste management and resource recovery, and
(11) consistency of waste management and resource recovery with Federal, state, and
local air and water pollution control, noise control, land use, and other environmental
policies and regulations." H.R. 5487, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, § 251 (1975). As
hearings on the bill reveal, however, even these proposed amendments would not have
resulted in an increased federal role in the area preempting the states from taking action
on their own. Such state action would still be permitted and therefore could continue
to result in provisions that, like the New Jersey Waste Act, make no effective contribution to the national effort to deal with the solid waste situation. Thus in response to
a query as to the desirability of areawide, rather than state-by-state approaches, the bill's
sponsor, Rep. Paul G. Rogers, declared, "Well, I think this is commendable, and I think
this should be encouraged. Areawide planning would be encouraged under section
255(b) of my bill, unless the state decides-as Connecticut has-to establish and operate a statewide plan." Hearings on H.R. 5487 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 101 (1975).
65. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 628,
517 P.2d 691, 696 (1973).
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tion for "disciplinary" or "punitive" purposes but have less frequently
considered rights of inmates segregated for "administrative" purposes.
In Sweet v. South CarolinaDepartment of Corrections,1 an inmate who
had been held in administrative segregation for five years for protection
from assault by other inmates claimed denial of equal protection of the
law and imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in that his living
conditions were not comparable to those of the general inmate population. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, ruled that
the lack of ordinary privileges, particularly full exercise and shower
opportunities, would implicate constitutional rights only if plaintiff's
health had been impaired as a consequence of such deprivation or if the
deprivation were not necessitated by prison security and order.2
Plaintiff Sweet was voluntarily placed in administrative segregation
in 1968 following threats of violence by other inmates, who apparently
suspected that plaintiff had been giving information to prison officials.3
Sweet filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in federal district court
against the Department of Corrections and its director requesting injunctive and monetary relief for unconstitutional imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment and for denial of equal protection. He claimed he
was given insufficient food, exercise and shower time, opportunity to
work, medical attention, reading and writing materials, and opportunity
to converse with other inmates. 4 He also claimed that he was denied
freedom to exercise his religion and to confer with counsel, and that
prison officials failed to investigate his complaints. 5 The conditions of
his administrative segregation, he argued, resembled those of prisoners
in punitive segregation despite the fact that his segregation was caused
by other inmates' threats rather than by his own misconduct.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint.6 The court of appeals, sitting en banc, found no factual basis for
many of the claims and ruled that other clear deprivations were necessary as a practical matter in the maintenance of prison order and
1. 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
2. Id. at 866.
3. The record is unclear about the reason for these threats. Both appellant and
appellee noted in their briefs that Sweet had given some sort of information to officials.
Brief for Appellant at 2; Brief for Appellee at 5.
4. 529 F.2d at 859.
5. Id.

6. Id. at 857.
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security and were thus constitutional. The court noted, however, that
the district court had not considered evidence of the effect on Sweet's
health of only two showers and two one-hour exercise periods per week
for an indefinite period of time. 7 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the monetary claims and remanded to the district court for
consideration of the health issue and the practicality of injunctive relief.'
Three appellate judges concurred, adding that inmates in protective
segregation should, so far as possible, be treated like the general inmate
population without regard to the expense involved.9 The concurring
judges further stated that the warden should be required to submit a
plan for protecting Sweet without imposing deprivations and that if he
were unable to do so, an independent consultant should be retained to
report feasible changes in Sweet's treatment to the district court. 10
Recent court decisions examining the rights of segregated prisoners
7. Id. at 866. The record from the evidentiary hearing before the district court
disclosed the following facts: (1) Sweet was given three full meals per day but was
perhaps denied extras by inmates who served the food and gave extras to others. (2)
Sweet had been allowed to work for a few brief periods, but his supervisor testified that
Sweet was removed because he could not get along with other inmates and because it was
unsafe for him to work in most places. (3) Sweet's cellblock was visited regularly by
medical technicians who reported serious cases to a doctor for further treatment. While
Sweet received no psychiatric treatment as such, prison records showed he had been seen
many times by the doctor and was scheduled for an operation to correct a disability in
his leg. (4) Sweet's cellblock was visited regularly by a chaplain who counseled inmates
and performed services privately for any inmate requesting such services and who also
provided writing materials to inmates on request. The chaplain testified that Sweet had
never asked him for anything but writing materials, which were provided. Officials
testified that it would be unsafe for Sweet to attend the prison's regular services and that
group services in the cellblock would be an unfair imposition on the privacy of other
inmates who would not want to be part of the services. The officials stated that group
services in an adjacent exercise yard were possible, but the chaplain felt that they would
be undesirable because the inconsistent outdoor services caused by the weather changes
would agitate the inmates. (5) Sweet admitted being given educational reading materials, and, according to officials, other books were brought to the cellblock. (6) There
was no evidence of lack of legal consultation or investigation of Sweet's complaints. (7)
Officials testified that Sweet was denied the opportunity to converse with other inmates
because he was loud and he aggravated them. See Joint Appendix for Appellant and
Appellee at 22A, 45A, 69A, 73A, 74A, 79A, 164A-75A, 183A-94A, 204A-05A.
8. 529 F.2d at 866. The majority opinion was written by Judge Russell and
joined in by Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judges Field and Widener. As to the
propriety of money damages, see generally United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149
(1966); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d
126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section
1983, 57 GEo. LJ. 1270, 1290-97 (1969).
9. 529 F.2d at 866, 869. The concurring opinion was written by Judge Butzner
and joined in by Judges Craven and Winter.
10. Id. at 869.
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have evaluated procedures'" and official justifications 12 for placing inmates in segregation and the substantive conditions of segregated confinement. The Supreme Court and inferior federal courts have given
form to substantive rights relevant to segregated prisoners through the
first amendment as well as the fifth and fourteenth amendments' right of
access to counsel and the courts.' 3 While the Supreme Court has not

directly ruled on the many substantive conditions of segregated confinement, the lower federal courts have had to address claims growing out of
various forms of prisoner deprivation. Even when an inmate is segregated only briefly, the courts have enjoined unsanitary physical conditions within segregation cells, 14 insufficient medical attention,'" or clearly inadequate protection from other inmates. 16 When the period of
segregation is extended, courts have declared unconstitutional unjustifia11. E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 421
U.S. 1010 (1975); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
885 (1975); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F.
Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), afrd, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972); Landmann v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark.
1967), vacated & remanded, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
12. E.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971); Davis v. Lindsay,
321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); 60 AM. JUR. 2d Penal and CorrectionalInstitutions § 46 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam); Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483 (1969); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). These cases
did not deal directly with segregated inmates. But cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972) (per curiam) (dismissal of pro se complaint); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413
(1967) (per curiam) (involuntary confession).
14. E.g., McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859
(1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d
126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857
(D.R.I. 1970) (mem.).
15. E.g., cases cited note 14 supra.
16. E.g., McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859
(1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971). The Fourth Circuit in Sweet relied on an earlier case in which a
nonsegregated inmate claimed he was being unconstitutionally deprived of protection
from inmate violence. In Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973), plaintiff
was in danger of assault, apparently in reprisal for aiding a younger prisoner who was
being sexually molested by other inmates. The lower court, after a hearing, dismissed
his complaint which alleged that he was being unconstitutionally deprived of protection
from inmate violence. 487 F.2d at 889. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff need not show past attacks or fear of
attack on his person. Plaintiff could establish cruel and unusual punishment if there
were a pervasive risk of harm from other inmates and if the prison officials were not
exercising reasonable care to protect him. Id. at 890.
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reading and writing materials,
ble deprivations involving food, exercise,
7
and isolation from human contact.'
In a leading case, Sostre v. McGinnis,8 a federal district court held
unconstitutional punitive segregation in excess of fifteen days when the

prisoner was subject to deprivations including a limit of one hour per
day of exercise and one shower per week. 9 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the prisoner's indefinite

segregation was constitutional for the following reasons:

(1) there

was no evidence of actual impairment of his own physical or mental
health and (2) there was conflicting evidence on the ordinary effects of

such segregation on health.'

The court also noted that plaintiff could

secure his release from segregation by agreeing to obey prison rules.2 '
In Spain v. Procunier,2 2 prisoners held in "administrative" segrega-

tion for four years pending disposition of criminal charges arising from
the murders of prison guards and inmates brought suit alleging cruel

and unusual punishment. In addition to the usual deprivations accompanying segregation that were present in Sweet and Sostre, plaintiffs

were denied any outdoor exercise, were bound in neck chains for all outof-cell movements, and occasionally were removed from their cells with
17. Relevant to Sweet are recent opinions suggesting that solitary confinement of
unlimited duration is per se unconstitutional. E.g., O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941,
944 (1st Cir. 1974) (dictum); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 207-09 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Feinberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
As to specific deprivations, see, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318,
332 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 412 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107
(D. Conn. 1973); Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Serv., 322 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); ABA COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES & SERV., SURVEY OF
UNITED STATES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS STANDARD MINIMUM RULES
FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 17-18, 51 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UN STANDARD

RULES] (noting that South Carolina adopted the Rules by executive order and reported
full compliance with rule requiring one hour of exercise per day); AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 402-03, 408-20 (3d ed. 1966)
(providing for daily exercise for segregated prisoners); M. HERMANN & M. HEFT,
PRISONERS'

RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK

113-23 (1973); L.

ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT,

TREATMENT 259 (1973) (quoting CONN. DEP'T OF CORRECTION, POLICY DIRECTIVE ON
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES) (providing for a minimum of two showers per week);
Annot., 18 A.L.R. FED. 7 (1974); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 111 (1973); 60 AM. JuR. 2d

Penal and CorrectionalInstitutions §§ 44-52 (1972).
18. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
19. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
20. 442 F.2d at 193-94 n.24.
21. Id. at 193.
22. 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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tear gas. 23 There was conflicting evidence as to the effect these deprivations were having on plaintiffs' health. 24 The federal district court held
that this combination of conditions was unconstitutional and singled out
the use of tear gas (except in riot situations) and neck chains as
unconstitutional corporal punishment.2 5 The court gave injunctive
relief including an order that plaintiffs be permitted one hour per day of
outdoor exercise five days per week, weather permitting, except in
emergencies. 2 '

The order was issued despite recognition by the court

that its holding would require extensive construction of new facilities
and the hiring of new personnel.

Disciplinary segregation is used as a means of discipline or punishment or as a means of protecting guards or other inmates.2 8 Administrative segregation, on the other hand, is used for many categories of

inmates: those in need of protection from other inmates, those awaiting disciplinary hearings or resolution of criminal proceedings, those
who are mentally ill, those awaiting transfer to another institution, and
occasionally those who are simply deemed dangerous to themselves,
guards, or other inmates. 29 In Wolff v. McDonnell,30 the Supreme
Court held that inmates are entitled to a due process hearing prior to
placement in disciplinary segregation; such hearings, however, have not
been generally required by lower courts for nondisciplinary administrative segregation. 3 ' The inmate who needs protection may be placed in
23. Id. at 541-45.
24. Id. at 538, 546.
25. Id. at 545.
26. Id. at 547.
27. ld. at 537.
28. For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons' policy is that "lain inmate may
be placed in disciplinary segregation when his continued presence in the general
population poses a serious threat to himself, staff, or other inmates or to the security of
the institution" and when "the inmate has been found to have committed a serious
violation of institution rules or regulations." BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT: INMATE DISCIPUNE, No. 7400.5D at 4 (July 7, 1975).
29. Use of administrative segregation to house inmates who are a threat to other
inmates or guards has blurred the distinctions between administrative and disciplinary
segregation. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United
States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), ajI'd, 467 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1972); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971); L. ORLAND,
supra note 17, at 258 (quoting CONN. DEP'T OF CORRECTION, POLICY DmETInVE ON
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES); McAninch, Penal Incarceration and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 25 S.C.L. Rnv. 579, 580 (1973). Officials in Sweet who testified about
uses of administrative segregation in South Carolina did not list this use.
30. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
31. Hearings have been required when administrative segregation is used for
inmates who are a threat to other inmates or guards. See cases cited note 29 supra. For
other uses of administrative segregation, hearings have not been required. See, e.g.,
Young v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 338 (5th Cir, 1971) (per curiam).
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administrative segregation by prison officials on their initiative or upon

request by the inmate.12 Although punitive segregation is usually of
shorter duration than administrative segregation, many experts criticize
the use of punitive segregation, whereas administrative segregation has
33
been generally approved.
Both the majority and concurring judges stressed that Sweet pos-

sessed a constitutional right to protection, and that under the circumstances, it was probably the officials' duty to honor his request for

protection.3 4 The entire court, therefore, apparently felt that a diminution of exercise and shower rights should not ideally condition access to
protective segregation. 5 However, while the majority held that considerations of Sweet's health and prison order and security were necessary
to a ruling on constitutional issues,3 6 the concurring judges would

require only a finding that Sweet's treatment could feasibly be improved
without regard to the expense involved in such improvements. 7 The
concurring judges also made specific recommendations that Sweet be
transferred to another prison, that those who made the threats be
segregated instead of Sweet, or that extra guards accompany Sweet in

the general population.38
There are fundamental reasons why such broad constitutional prin-

ciples, when applied to the treatment of protected, segregated prisoners,
32. See generally cases cited notes 29 & 31 supra.
33. E.g., UN STANDARD RULES, supra note 17, at 40, 47 (under the Rules,
separation of prisoners should be used only for protection, treatment or for supervision
of the mentally abnormal); ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON
ADVOCACY, A PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM 14 n.10 (1972); L. ORLAND, supra note 17,
at 249 (American Correctional Association policy is to prefer administrative segregation
over punitive segregation for long terms); id. at 353 (§ 3(d) of the Model Act drafted by
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency supports use of segregation only for the
protection of inmates and personnel, not for punishment). Extended solitary confinement has been described as the "most widespread, controversial, and inhumane of current
penal practices. . . ." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CoRuRcrIMONS].
34. 529 F.2d at 859, 867. See note 16 supra.
35. See 529 F.2d at 859, 867-69.
36. Deprivations of mental or physical health, whether intentionally inflicted or
not, are being recognized by corrections experts as unwarranted "corporal punishment."
See L. ORLAND, supra note 17, at 248-49; M. RICHMOND, PISON PROFILES 77, 90
(1965); Note, supra note 8, at 1286-87. See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958).
37. 529 F.2d at 868.

See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201

(8th Cir. 1974) (lack of funds not an acceptable excuse for overcrowded prisons);
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (rejecting claim by Arkansas
officials that the use of a strap was valid punishment due to the expense of constructing
then unavailable segregation facilities).
38. 529 F.2d at 869.
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do not adequately deal with present prison conditions. The courts, in
defining constitutional rights of prison inmates, have balanced the rights
of the imprisoned individual against the interests of the prison administration. This balancing test fails analytically because it does not take
into account a crucial factor: the existence and nature of a unique
inmate society within prisons. 9 It is a totalitarian society often characterized by idleness, boredom and inter-inmate hatred and violence;
relationships between inmates and guards or officials are less important.40 Courts are capable of making informed judgments on the
constitutional rights of a prisoner as he interacts with the familiar world
outside of prison; however, the judiciary seems uncomfortable with the
task in cases in which the rights asserted involve the closed world within
prisons.4 '
The court in Sweet did not adequately consider the fact that
plaintiff was suspected by other prisoners of violating one of the most
basic norms of inmate society by giving unsolicited information to
prison officials. An expected result of this supposed breach of trust is
unrelenting, potentially violent hatred directed toward the "informant"
by most of the inmate population.42 As experts acknowledge, prison
39. The writer's opinions on this issue are mostly a result of his experiences and
observations while confined in North Carolina youthful offender prisons in 1970. See
Note, supra note 8, at 1287 (cotirts should give credence to the human interactions
within the prison environment, which may make rehabilitation impossible). See also
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
40. Lloyd Ohlin has described prison society as follows: "A prison is not a
collection of unrelated individuals. It is a highly organized system of roles, relationships, rules and 'activities. The treatment preoccupation with individual offenders has
obscured the heavy impact of the prison organization on offenders, not as individuals but
as members of the social system." M. RICHMOND, supra note 36, at 131 (quoting L.
OHLIN, TARGETS FOR CHANGE IN CORRECTIONAL INsTITrUTIONS).
See ANNUAL EARL
WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY, supra note 33, at 47-56; L. ORLAND, supra note 17,
at 127, 153, 167-68, 173-76; U.S. DEP'T OF JuSrTcE, PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE IN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 16-17, 41 (1973) (a collection of papers presented at the
Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology).
41. Perhaps this explains the Supreme Court's reluctance to judge the constitutionality of many substantive conditions in this area. Access to counsel and the courts, and
visiting and correspondence privileges involve extenuated contacts with the outside world.
Conversely, discipline, protection, and classification of inmates are primarily internal
processes. See M. HERMANN & M. HEFT, supra note 17, at 114; Note, supra note 8, at
1281-82 n.80.
42. Joint Appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 14A-24A, 88A, 141A; Brief for
Appellant at 8, Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir.
1975). The officials testified that Sweet would be in danger regardless of who was in
the inmate population, even in twenty years, and that Sweet could not adapt to the prison
population due to a general inability to get along with other inmates. Id. See M.
RICHMOND, supra note 36, at 102 (cooperation and compliance with authority may lead
to an inability to take care of oneself).
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order is maintained at least partly through the consent of the inmates;4"
Sweet was thus probably as much a threat to order in the prison as an

inmate who was considered a "discipline" problem.

The concurring

judges' recommendation that the officials isolate or transfer those who

threatened Sweet instead of segregating Sweet is unrealistic. Given the
severity of Sweet's supposed breach and the unanimity of inmate antago-

nism to such actions, many inmates would probably threaten Sweet.
This unanimity and the fact that inmate gossip is regularly passed from
prison to prison also make transfer of Sweet to another prison an unwise

administrative reaction unless inter-inmate contact and transfer of inmates were unusually rare between the two prisons."4
Additionally, the concurring judges oversimplified the problem by
suggesting that extra guards be assigned to Sweet as he interacted with
the general inmate population and by stating that the expense involved

in giving Sweet better treatment was irrelevant.

Expense generally

dictates the levels of prison physical facilities, programs and personnel. 45

While a court may limit mail censorship, for example, without directly
increasing prison expenses, most problems of internal management,
even when constitutional rights are involved, require that expense be

considered.4 6 Many prisoners suffer deprivations that are arguably
unconstitutional even when resources available to prisons are correctly
allocated.4 7 At the very least, any adjustment that necessitates reallocation of resources to one prisoner will in some way deprive another. If

Sweet and other prisoners in administrative segregation were given more
exercise time, guards would probably have to be transferred to supervise

that inmate exercise, and the risk of escape or violence in other areas
43. U.S.

DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, supra note 40, at 17-18.
44. Sweet was convicted of statutory rape. The Department of Corrections had a
policy of not allowing sex offenders in minimal security prisons. See UN STANDARD
RULES, supra note 17, at 15-16 (Rule 8, approving separation of inmates based on
criminal record). As a result there were only two institutions at which Sweet could be
kept; Sweet had already been at the other institution, where he had problems. Joint
Appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 7A, 16A. There is a solution under federal
statutes authorizing transfer of certain inmates between a state prison system and the
federal prison system. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 5003, 5013 (1970). This alternative has
been employed for inmates threatened by other inmates.
45. See UN STANDARD RULES, supra note 17, at 53 (lack of resources at the heart
of most noncompliance with the Rules); N.C. PENAL SYS. STUDY COMM'N, N.C. BAR
ASS'N, INTmaM REPORT (1971) (finding that North Carolina is trying to operate a
twentieth-century system with nineteenth-century facilities).
46. See note 41 supra. Cf. Brief for Appellant at 32 (arguing particularly that
expenses cannot justify first amendment restrictions).
47. This is most obvious when basic resources such as housing are lacking. See
Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1976); sources cited note 45 supra
and note 55 infra.
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would increase.48 An alternative solution worth consideration would be
to shift employees from education, training, and counseling to custodial
duties. 49 However, it is likely that requests for administrative segregation (from inmates truly in fear of violence,"0 as well as those who might
like the rare privacy afforded by segregation) would increase far beyond

prison facility capabilities if such segregation were not accompanied by
a loss of some privileges. Some concomitant "deprivation" operates to
allocate the prison's scarce resources in such a way as to accommodate
the needs of inmates.

Nevertheless, official justification for prisoner deprivations based
on the necessity of prison order or on expense should be closely scrutinized by the courts.

For example, the officials in Sweet testified that

they could not allow Sweet to exercise, work, or worship with the
general prison population because he would have to be accompanied
and protected by a guard on all occasions, but these officials contradicted themselves by saying that, although they would not recommend it,
they would allow Sweet to move out of segregation and back into the

general prison population if he chose to do so. 5' Considering the duty
of officials to take all reasonable precautions for Sweet's protection, 2 he
should probably be retained in administrative segregation even if he

desired to move back in the population. This apparent contradiction
should have been recognized, if not resolved, in Sweet.

The court was wise in remanding to the district court for further
fact-finding, 53 and sensitive in its concern that long term segregation can
48. Prison officials in Sweet stated that religious services were once held in
plaintiffs cellblock but were discontinued due to a lack of personnel. They argued that
in order to double the showers and exercise time of the inmates in the cell block, it would
be necessary to double the number of guards assigned there during those periods. Joint
Appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 45A, 57A; Brief for Appellee at 7. Such a lack
of resources is widespread; given these scarcities, classification of inmates is argued as
the best means of allocating resources and in fact has that goal as its primary purpose.
CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, at 210; L. ORLAND, supra note 17, at 219. See also U.S.
DEP't of JUSTcE, supra note 40, at 16-17; Note, Constitutional Limitations on the
Conditions of PretrialDetention, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 955 n.90 (1970).
49. This solution draws support from a recent realization by corrections experts
that "rehabilitation" does not usually occur in prisons and that emphasis is more properly
placed on providing humane conditions in prisons. See note 39 supra.
50. It has been said that to eliminate the possibility of violence, all detainees in
jails would have to be kept under maximum security. Note, supra note 48, at 955. Thus,
a doctrine that a prisoner has an absolute right to be free from harm seems impossible to
put into effect and therefore unwise. See Co.REqa oNs, supra note 33, at 32; Note,
supra note 8, at 1297.
51. Joint appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 159A.
52. See note 16 supra.
53. The Fourth Circuit thus required more serious consideration of the conditions
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impair physical and mental health.

When such adverser effects on

health occur, the inmate's deprivations deserve special attention by the
courts. 54 The success of such judicial entry into areas formerly controlled by prisoners and administrators requires not only the courts'
sense of justice but also their ability and willingness to become familiar
with the strange society and the allocation of resources within prisons. 55
CURTIS

H.

SITTERSON

of administrative segregation than in Breedon v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972).
In that case, plaintiff was voluntarily placed in segregation to protect him from inmate
assaults. He claimed that as a result of segregation he was subjected to unconstitutional
deprivations including limited exercise and bathing opportunities and demanded monetary relief. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal without a hearing
and concluded as a matter of law that there was no violation of the Constitution. 457
F.2d at 581.
In two recent cases involving suits brought by inmates in segregation, the Supreme
Court has reversed lower courts' dismissals without hearings. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319 (1972) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
The concurring judges in Sweet were realistic in recognizing the need for ascertaining the informed advice of an independent consultant to suggest constitutionally acceptable means of initiating effective segregated confinement. It is interesting to note that
South Carolina is one of the few jurisdictions with a formal prison inspection system.
UN STANDARD RULES, supra note 17, at 35.
54. The court's holding in Sweet was applied recently in Dorrough v. Hogan, No.
C74-1823A (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 1976). Plaintiffs filed a class action; they were being
held in administrative segregation and limited to two one-hour exercise periods a week.
After a full trial, the court entered an order allowing twenty more days before entering a
final ruling for parties to submit pleadings on the health and practicality issues. The
court expressed another concern:
This court tends to agree with the court in [Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869,
876-77 (M.D. Pa. 1976)] when it held that a court order requiring daily exercise is appropriate when overall conditions are found to be substandard, but
that an order requiring the prison officials to merely change their exercise
schedule might be an unwarranted intrusion into an area governed by official
discretion.
No. C74-1823A, slip op. at 2.
55. See ANNUAL EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADvOCACY, supra note 33, at 49,
53-59. Since the courts cannot force legislatures to appropriate more funds to prisons,
courts may be tempted to force quick changes by simply ordering the release of prisoners
held under unconstitutional conditions. See generally Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp.
544, 548-49 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973); Hamilton v. Love,
328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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Environmental Law - Kleppe v. Sierra Club: Addressing the
Question of Programmatic Impact Statements
Section 102(2)(C)l of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)2 requires federal' officials to prepare an environmental
impact statement (EIS) for "every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."'4 Because of the inevitable conflict between the broad language of the Act' and existing
agency decisional procedures, a constant stream of litigation concerning
the required scope of an EIS has followed NEPA's enactment. One
of the questions that has arisen from agency conflict has been: if, within
a given region, a federal agency is involved in related projects for which
individual impact statements have already been prepared, does NEPA
require the agency to prepare a regional (programmatic)" impact statement as well? Reversing a District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 7 the United States Supreme Court, in Kleppe v. Sierra
Club," held that the Department of the Interior was not required by
NEPA to prepare a regional EIS for the Northern Great Plains region
where the Department was leasing coal mines for development.
The Northern Great Plains region, a rich coal basin covering
portions of Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota,9 is
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
3. Id. § 4332(2)(D) (Supp. V 1975), added by the National Environmental Policy Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424, allows, under certain
conditions, a state agency or official to prepare an impact statement.
4. Id. § 4332(2) (C).
5. The scope of federal activity to be covered by an EIS is broad because of
NEPA's requirements that the federal government "improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources . .. to attain the widest range of beneficial
uses of the environment without degradation . . . ." id. § 4331(b)(3); "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach," id. § 4332(2)(A); develop alternatives to recommended projects, id. § 4332(2) (E);,and "recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems," id. § 4332(2) (F).
6. In this Note, the phrases "programmatic EIS" and "comprehensive EIS" will be
used synonymously with "regional EIS." The first two phrases, however, are not always
synonymous with "regional" since programs involve several projects that may extend beyond a given region. In Kleppe, the phrases were synonymous since all the projects were
within the same region.
7. Sierra: Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
8. 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976).
9. According to the Brief for Petitioners at 4 n.2, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S.
Ct. 2718 (1976), the Department of the Interior has divided the Nation's coal lands into
six provinces, one of which is the Northern Great Plains province. The Department
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owned to a large extent by the United States government.
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Under the

Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,10 the Secretary Of the Interior
(Secretary) is authorized to divide and lease for development any coal
lands owned by the federal government.1 1 In 1972, the Department
of the Interior (Department) undertook the Northern Great Plains

12
Resources Program (NGPRP), a federal-state, interagency study

devoted entirely to environmental concerns of the region. 13 Further,
in 1973, the Secretary announced a complete review of the De-

partment's national coal leasing program, which was designed "to study
the environmental impact of the Department's entire range of coal

related activities and to develop a planning system to guide the national
4
leasing program.'
In July 1973, Sierra and other environmental groups brought suit

against the Secretary, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
further coal development within the region' 5 pending preparation of
defines that province as including the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Nebraska
and Colorado.
10. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
11. Id. § 201(a).
12. The court of appeals noted that the Secretary of the Interior had shown concern over NEPA's effect on development of the Northern Great Plains province and had
recognized that NEPA might require comprehensive development of the province and
a more comprehensive environmental impact analysis than would be allowed by impact
statements for individual mines. The court attributed the NGPRP and an earlier study,
the North Central Power Study of 1970, to this recognition on the part of the Secretary.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
13. 96 S. Ct. at 2724. The court of appeals described the purpose of the NGPRP
as follows: "to assess the potential social, economic, and environmental impacts that
development of the Province would cause." 514 F.2d at 863.
14. 96 S.Ct. at 2725. The study resulted in a "Coal Programmatic EIS" that was
finalized in September 1975. From the study came a proposed leasing program based
on the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System and an evaluation of the possible environmental impact of the national program as well as alternatives to the program. While the study was being conducted, the Secretary put into effect a "short term
leasing policy" to restrict new leasing during the review. Id. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals later found large loopholes in the restrictions imposed upon
development of the province allowing federal activity to proceed:
(1) mhe short-term leasing program applies only to new leases and does
not interfere with the Department's ability to approve mining plans for preexisting leases in the area; (2) some leases may be issued under the shortterm leasing policy itself; and (3) federal activity in the Province is not really
suspended pending issuance of the NGPRP, but rather can continue upon approval of the Under Secretary.
514 F.2d at 864-65. In fact, between the time restrictions were imposed in February
1973 and the June 1975 decision of the court of appeals, at least four mining plans were
approved and approval of four more mines in the Eastern Powder River Coal Basin was
pending. Id. at 865.
15. For a discussion of the activity in the province, see 514 F.2d at 864-66.
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a regional EIS.'6 The district court found no regional federal action
within the meaning of NEPA and held that a regional impact statement is not necessary for individual projects related only by geography.
After oral argument on appeal by Sierra Club, 17 the Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit granted a motion for a limited
injunction pending its decision: the Secretary was ordered to take no

further action regarding mining plans and railroad rights-of-way in the
Eastern Powder River Coal Basin. 8 Thereafter, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded, 19 concluding that
when the federal government, through exercise of its power to
approve leases, mining plans, rights-of-way, and water option contracts, attempts to "control development" of a definite region, it
is engaged in a regional program constituting major federal action
within the meaning of NEPA, whether
it labels its attempts a
"plan," a "program," or nothing at all. 20

The court of appeals believed that a comprehensive major federal
action was "contemplated" in the Northern Great Plains; therefore, a
balancing of four factors 2' used in an earlier decision 22 would be necessary to determine the time during the program when the EIS would
be required.23 The temporary injunction was continued,2 4 however,
to allow the Department to determine its future role in the region and,
16. Jurisdiction was asserted under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §§
1331(a) & 1361 (1970).
17. The district court had found that the region identified by Sierra Club was not
"'an entity, region or area which has been defined by the Federal Government by statute
or executive action' for purposes of any Federal program, project, or action." 514 F.2d
at 867. It had further concluded that "'[there is no existing or proposed Federal regional program, plan, project, or other regional "federal action" within the meaning of
NEPA Section 102(2) for the development of coal or other resources' in the Northern
Great Plains region." Id. Having so determined, the court held that "in the absence
of regional federal action, multiple applications for individual federal action in connection with individual private projects which are unrelated to one another except geographically do not either constitute regional federal action or mandate a regional impact statement." Id.
18. Id. at 868.
19. Id. at 884.
20. Id. at 878.
21. The four factors were: (1) How likely and how soon is the program to come
to fruition? (2) To what extent is valid information now available on the effects of
implementation of the program and of alternatives? (3) To what extent are irretrievable commitments being made and options being precluded as the proposal progresses?
(4) How severe will the environmental effects of program implementation be? Id. at
880.
22. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. (SIPI) v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
23. 514 F.2d at 880.
24. Id. at 883.
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based upon that role, to determine whether an impact statement was
25
necessary.
In early 1976, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction and
granted the Secretary's petition for certiorari. 2 Noting that the Secretary agreed that NEPA section 102(2) (C) required both individual
impact statements for the single leases involved and a Coal Programmatic EIS to accompany the new national leasing program,2 7 the Court
agreed with the Secretary: NEPA did not require the Secretary to prepare an EIS on the entire Northern Great Plains region because there
had been no report or recommendation on a proposal for major federal
action with respect to that region.28 In addition, the Court specifically
agreed with the district court that the NGPRP was not a recommendation or report on a proposal for major federal action and, hence, did
not fall within NEPA's section 102(2) (C).29
In response to the court of appeals' opinion, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Secretary had not contemplated a regional plan or
proposal3 and that, even if he had contemplated such a plan, NEPA
does not require an impact statement prior to "the time at which it
makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action. 3 1
According to the Court NEPA requires no balancing test such as was
promulgated by the court of appeals.32 Before the Supreme Court, the
Sierra Club contended 33 that a regional impact statement is required
25. The court of appeals was unable, due to an incomplete record, to conclude an
analysis of the four balancing factors; it therefore remanded to allow the Department
to complete the NGPRP. Based on the NGPRP, the Department was to determine its
role in the region and the necessity for a programmatic EIS. Id. at 882.
26. 96 S. Ct. at 2714. The Court noted that shortly after the injunction was
stayed, the Secretary approved the four mining plans in the East Powder River Coal
Basin. Id.
27. Id. at 2726.
28. Id. at 2726-27.
29. Id. at 2726. The Court, relying on a statement by the Secretary, found irrelevant, for purposes of a regional EIS, the NGPRP. Such a study, according to the Secretary, is a "prelude to informed agency planning and provide[s] the data base on which
the Department may decide to take specific actions for which impact statements are prepared." Id. at 2731.
30. Id. at 2727.
31. Id. at 2728 (quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320
(1975) (SCRAP II)).
32. Id. at 2729.
33. Sierra Club had decided not to support the court of appeals' decision for obvious reasons: SCRAP 1I,422 U.S. 289 (1975), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d
856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), were both decided in June 1975. SCRAP II essentially silenced
the court of appeals' opinion since it clearly held that an EIS is necessary only at the
time an agency makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for major federal action. After that, by order of the Supreme Court the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
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on all coal-related projects in the region "because they are intimately
related. '34 The Court considered this argument susceptible of two
interpretations. 35 The first interpretation imposed upon Sierra's contention was that the individual impact statements were inadequate.
The Court refused to consider this interpretation since the case was not
brought as a challenge to a particular EIS and there was no EIS in the
record. Second, the Court considered that Sierra's contention could be
interpreted as an attack on the Secretary's decision not to prepare one
regional EIS. The Court agreed with this second view that section
102(2)(C) may require a comprehensive EIS in limited situations in
which several proposed actions are pending at the same time; the decision to prepare a comprehensive EIS, however, was considered to
be one for the agency. Accordingly, the Court refused to reverse the
agency's decision unless it could be shown to be arbitrary and capricious.3 6 In Kleppe, the Court found nothing arbitrary in the Secretary's
decision not to prepare a regional EIS;17 therefore, in a seven-two
split, 8 the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision.
The first involvement of the Supreme Court in the chain of cases
leading to Kleppe was Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad v. SCRAP
(SCRAP 1I).11 There the Court answered, at least superficially, the
question of when, in the life of a project, a final EIS is required. The
Court interpreted section 102(2)(C) literally: an agency must prepare the final EIS at the "time at which it makes a recommendation
or report on a proposalfor federal action. 4 9 Subsequently the SCRAP
1I analysis was applied to a programmatic impact statement case in
in Conservation Soe'y, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), was required to apply SCRAP 11 to a highway segmentation case. The court
found that, since there was no comprehensive program, no comprehensive EIS was required. The Sierra Club, therefore, relied upon another argument made before the court
of appeals but not reached by that court.
34. 96 S. Ct. at 2730.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2731.
37. Id.

38. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined, concurred in part and dissented in part. His disagreement with the majority was based on his belief that although
a final EIS is due at the time at which an agency makes a recommendation or report
on a program for federal action, preparation of that statement must be commenced early
in the process. Id. at 2734. This approach is necessary, Marshall reasoned, to comply
with the mandate of NEPA that early consideration of environmental consequences be
made possible through production of the EIS. Id. Marshall found that the test devised
by the Second Circuit was an effective remedy. Id. at 2735.
39. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
40. Id. at 320.
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4
ConservationSociety, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation.
The district
42
court had required a comprehensive impact statement for an entire
highway despite the absence of a federal plan for the entire route, because it found that the three states through which the highway passed
were looking toward development of the entire corridor into a superhighway. 3 On the basis of SCRAP 1141 the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, and on remand the Second Circuit held that a comprehensive EIS could not be required since there was "no overall federal
45
plan.
The purpose of an environmental impact statement is "to aid in
the agencies' own decision making process and to advise other interested agencies and the public of the environmental consequences of
planned federal action. 4 6 The initial determination to prepare an environmental impact statement, the so-called threshold decision, rests
with the agency responsible for the federal action. NEPA requires
that impact statements be prepared for major federal actions "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 4 7 Before
Kleppe, the standard of judicial review of threshold determinations had
varied among the federal courts.4 8 The majority of courts had adopted
41. 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded sub nom. Coleman v.
Conservation Soc'y, Inc., 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Conservation
Soc'y, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
42. Conservation Soc'y, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt.
1973).
43. Id. at 636.
44. The Court also reversed in light of the National Environmental Policy Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D)
(Supp. V 1975), which allows state agencies and officers, under certain conditions, to
prepare an EIS).
45. Based on SCRAP I1 and Conservation Society, the result in Kleppe comes as
no surprise. In fact, those two opinions appear to render the Kleppe opinion unnecessary. A closer consideration of Kleppe, however, yields two reasons for which the Court
decided the case. First, on the issue of timing, the Court rejected specifically the four
factor balancing test first promulgated by the District of Columbia Circuit in 1973 and
revived by the same lower court in this case. Second, -on the issue of the scope of an
EIS, the Court provided some guidance as to the circumstances under which a programmatic EIS will be necessary even in the absence of a proposal. This Note will focus
only on the latter issue and will analyze the Court's treatment of programmatic impact
statements.
46. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F.
Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806
(E.D. Tenn. 1972).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
48. For discussions of judicial review of agency determinations, see Anderson,
The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 35662 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Comment, Environmental Law: Judicial Review of Federal Agency Actions under NEPA, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 866 (1975).
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an extremely lenient standard: an agency's decision would not be overturned unless deemed arbitrary and capricious. Other courts had required that an agency's threshold determination be reasonable-an approach that allows a closer examination of an agency decision than does
the arbitrariness standard.4 9 A third standard adopted by some courts
was de novo review, a strict standard by which the court construed
the relevant statutory terms5" and then applied them to the facts in the
51
case.
The arbitrary and capricious standard adopted by the Kleppe
Court has not been a clearly defined standard in environmental law
cases; even among courts that agreed that arbitrariness is the standard,
there was little agreement on the meaning of the term. Some courts
have looked at an agency's decision with closer scrutiny than an arbitrariness standard requires. In Hanly v. Kleindienst,52 for example, the
Second Circuit, having already required a "reviewable environmental
record, 53 also set forth procedural requirements for the threshold
determination 54 that, in the long run, might make the impact statement
itself the less arduous alternative. 55
In determining whether an EIS is necessary, federal officials have
little guidance in the broad language of NEPA. The Act does not set
forth factors to be considered in making the determination, and courts
have reached no consensus as to what those factors should be. At least
one attempt to establish procedures to be followed and factors to be
considered has led to criticism that the threshold determination would
itself become a mini-impact statement.5 6 Due to the scale of federal
action potentially necessitating a programmatic EIS, the threshold
determination for a programmatic statement is not likely to be any easier
than for a project EIS. Furthermore, the programmatic statement is
designed to achieve something beyond that which is achieved by a single project statement so that an agency's determination of the necessity
of a programmatic EIS should involve other considerations.
49. E.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Wyoming
Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
50. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
51. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
52. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (Hanly 1I).
53. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hanly I).
54. 471 F.2d at 835.
55. See Anderson, supra note 48, at 358 for an analysis of Hanly H.
56. 471 F.2d at 837 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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Prior to Kleppe, there had been a split of authority on the question

of the necessity of a programmatic impact statement.f 7 Even when a
program has been proposed by a federal agency, thereby meeting
SCRAP 11 requirements, the courts have failed to agree on the question

of requiring a programmatic EIS. The majority approach, derived
from a case involving one segment of a highway program, 58 has applied
an "independent utility" test. Generally, the independent utility test
mandates "so long as each major federal action is undertaken individually and not as an indivisible integral part of an integrated. . . system,

then the requirements of NEPA are determined on an individual major
federal action basis." 59 Cases applying the independent utility test 60
generally have involved highway projects, multi-phased dam systems or
reservoir systems.61

Rarely, however, in cases involving resource

development, have the courts required a comprehensive EIS. 2
57. While NEPA does not specifically mandate a detailed statement to cover geographically related major federal actions, various sections of the Act, when read together,
may be interpreted to require such statements. See note 5 supra. The Council on Environmental Quality has issued guidelines stating that "[ilndividual actions that are related either geographically or as logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions may
be more appropriately evaluated in a single, program statement." Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum to Federal Agencies on Procedures for Improving Environmental Impact Statements (May 16, 1972), quoted in Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info.,
Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Furthermore, the foremost authority on NEPA has interpreted the Act as rejecting an incremental approach to planning
and as depending upon programmatic impact statements for its success. Anderson, supra
note 48, at 321.
58. Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11, 19 (8th Cir. 1973). The court
balanced the need for long-range planning and the advisability of considering long-range
environmental effects of a state highway system against the practical necessities of project completion and concluded that the EIS must, at a minimum, cover the length of a
federally funded highway that is "supportable by logical termini at each end." Id.
59. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp. 131, 139 (N.D.
Cal.), af!'d, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 41-6 U.S. 974 (1974).
60. The "independent utility" test was originally a standard used to determine minimum project size but was soon adopted as a measure of the need for a programmatic
EIS. One student author has criticized the latter application of the test, stating that,
as applied, it means: "[s]o long as a project has some independent justification, its role
as part of a larger program of interrelated, although not completely interdependent, units
is usually ignored." Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements under
the National Environmental Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
124, 142 (1975).
61. See, e.g., Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975) (highway segment);
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) (two-phased dam system);
Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974) (system of reservoirs); Indian
Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973) (interstate highway projects);
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Sierra Club
v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974) (system of reservoirs); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1973).
62. In one case, Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973),
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Generally, three approaches have been used in refusing to require programmatic statements in resource development cases:3 (1) an inde-

pendent utility test;64 (2) a test of interdependence so refined that a
programmatic EIS would be required only if the projects are essentially
indivisible;65 (3) a federal funding test, meaning that separate funding
of a project is interpreted as evidence showing independence. 0
While the Kleppe opinion did not refer to the independent
utility test or to any other test, the language used by the court may
be read to spell the demise of such tests, at least as sole determinants
of whether a programmatic statement is necessary.6 7 The test, it appears, for determining whether, in the absence of a federal program,
a programmatic impact statement is necessary, is whether the federal
agency can meet its duty under section 102(2)(C) to "assure consideration of the environmental impact of their action in decisionmaking."' 8
The Supreme Court stated:
A comprehensive impact statement may be necessary in some cases
for an agency to meet this duty. Thus, when several proposals
for coal-related actions that will have cumulative or synergistic
environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be consida! 'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974), a federal district court did require a comprehensive
statement for a resource development plan. The United States Forest Service, pursuant
to a plan adopted prior to NEPA's effective date, was administering timber sales in the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) of the Superior National Forest. A Minnesota
federal district court found that the cumulative effect of timber sales by the Forest Service since NEPA's effective date constituted a major federal action requiring a programmatic EIS.
After the BWCA EIS and Management Plan were published by the Forest Service,
plaintiffs filed another action claiming, inter alia, that the EIS and Management Plan
were procedurally and substantively inadequate under NEPA. The federal district court
agreed. Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D.Minn. 1975). In 1976, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the EIS prepared by the Forest Service
adequate for past actions in the BWCA. Citing Kleppe, the court of appeals, however,
did continue the injunction as to future timber sales since it found that the Forest Service
had not completed its plan for such sales and that, upon its completion a comprehensive
EIS would be necessary. 9 ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1220, 1232 (8th Cir. 1976). See note
86 infra. The distinction between this case and Kleppe is that here the Forest Service
did have a plan for further timber sales.
63. Comment, supra note 60, at 144-46.
64. Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974).
65. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
66. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd sub ioin.
Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. 96 S.Ct. at 2730.
68. Id. (quoting Conference Report on NEPA, 115 CONe. Rec. 40416 (1969)
(Senate)).
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ered together. Only through comprehensive consideration of pending proposals can the agency evaluate different courses of action., 9

While the Court would impose programmatic impact statements only
in narrow circumstances when there is not a federal program, the Court
appears aware of the value of such statements.
The value of programmatic impact statements has been attributed
to their practical contributions to the planning process. 70 A programmatic EIS is especially helpful in providing information to analyze (1)
alternatives to individual major federal actions and (2) cumulative and
synergistic environmental effects of a number of federal projects.
Generally, the alternatives to a major federal action that must be considered are those "reasonably. related to the purpose of the project."7 "
The question of the extent to which environmental consequences of alternatives to a given federal project must be considered was addressed
by Natural Resourses Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton (NRDC).71 In
NDRC, the District of Columbia Circuit held inadequate an EIS prepared by the Department of the Interior on its proposed sale of offshore
leases because the EIS failed to consider the environmental consequences of alternative courses of action, even though those alternatives
were available not to Interior, but to other federal agencies. Despite
the result, NRDC's contribution to the issue of alternatives consideration has been attributed to its rule of reasonableness. The NRDC
court stated that "[i]n the last analysis, the requirement as to alternatives is subject to a construction of reasonableness .

. .

. Where the

environmental aspects of alternatives are readily identifiable by the
agency, it is reasonable to state them .... "178
Another reason for programmatic impact statements is to provide
a clearer basis for understanding cumulative and synergistic impacts of
the various projects at a time that is meaningful for the decision process. The Council on Environmental Quality has stated that the phrase
"major Federal actions" of NEPA section 102(2)(C)
69. Id. at 2730-31 (footnotes omitted).
70. The Council on Environmental Quality has issued guidelines stating the advantages of a programmatic EIS: "it provides an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects and alternatives than would be practicable in a statement on an individual
action. It insures consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a caseby-case analysis. And it avoids duplicative reconsideration of basic quality questions."
Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum to Federal Agencies on Procedures for
Improving Environmental Impact Statements (May 16, 1972), quoted in Scientists' Inst.
for Pub. Info., Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. E.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1974).
72. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
73.

Id. at 837.
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is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall, cumulative
impact of the action proposed, related Federal actions and projects
in the area, and further actions contemplated. . . . [An environmental statement should be prepared if it is reasonable to anticipate
a cumulatively
significant impact on the environment from Federal
74
action.
Despite a vague realization by some courts that a programmatic EIS
will provide a better understanding of cumulative environmental
impacts and, thus, a better basis upon which to make decisions about
individual projects, 5 no case has dealt specifically with its planning
value insofar as cumulative impacts are concerned. A comprehensive
EIS allows the planner to select among alternative projects in a manner
that will maximize resource development while maintaining an "acceptable" cumulative level of adverse environmental impacts. This result
is, of course, consistent with NEPA section 101(b)(3), 70 which makes
it the responsibility of federal agencies to "attain the widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation .

. . ."

In

many cases, a comprehensive EIS is necessary if the federal agency,
according to the NEPA mandate, is to "utilize a systematic . . .
approach" 78 in making decisions affecting the human environment.
Under the Kleppe formulation, there are two possible situations
in which a programmatic statement will be required when there is in
fact no program. First, the federal agency itself may determine its
necessity. The Court seemed optimistic about this possibility, noting
that the Secretary had recently adopted an approach that would require,
in certain situations, the preparation of a single EIS instead of multiple
statements.7 9 The Court, however, overlooked the premise of NEPA
that environmental concerns are likely to be secondary'considerations
to agencies whose goals are nonenvironmental. 0 With a history of
emphasis on agency goals as opposed to agency planning processes,
agencies may be expected to skirt additional steps in order to
74. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1975), quoted in Note, Major Federal Actions under
the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act, 44 FORDHAM L. REv.580, 593-94 (1975).
75. See, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Minnesota PIRG
v. Butz, 358 F.Supp. 584 (D.Minn. 1973), afj'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (3) (1970).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 4332(2)(A).
79. 96 S. Ct. at 2731. To environmentalists this approach will still be insufficient
in some cases in which both a programmatic EIS and individual statements are necessary
for NEPA purposes. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 122 (1973).
80. For a statement of that premise, see Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 515 (1974).
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achieve agency aims.A' Second, -the threshold decision of an administrator not to prepare a comprehensive EIS may be attacked as arbitrary
and capricious. This standard of judicial review is the most lenient of
the approaches used previously by federal courts; as applied by some
of the courts in EIS cases, however, the arbitrariness standard has required stricter procedures than in other cases."2 Perhaps some stricter
procedure will also be expected when courts review the threshold decision in programmatic EIS cases.
The Kleppe opinion contains unclear signals to administrators on
the issue of factors that must be considered in determining whether
the programmatic statement is necessary. The Court suggested that
evaluation of "different courses of action" might prompt the need for
a programmatic statement; 3 the Court, however, did not discuss the
extent to which an agency must consider alternatives to a program, thus
appearing to leave NRDC 4 as the leading case on that question. The
Court also stated that "[c]umulative environmental impacts are, indeed,
what require a comprehensive impact statement."85 This flat assertion
and the Court's treatment of the timing issue in SCRAP II combined,
suggest that the Court did not understand the impact NEPA was intended to have on the planning process. When a programmatic EIS
is considered for separate major federal actions already requiring individual impact statements, each one of those separate projects, by definition, has an environmental impact and, consequently, a cumulative
impact. It is, therefore, difficult to understand what the Court meant
in its statement that such impacts necessitate a comprehensive EIS.88
The purpose of 'requiring a programmatic EIS is twofold: first, it provides an agency with sufficient information to evaluate the program
against alternative programs; second, it provides data by which individual projects and combinations of projects within the program may
be evaluated against the other individual projects and combinations.
81. See generally Comment, supra note 60.
82. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
83. 96 S. Ct. at 2731.
84. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
85. 96 S. Ct. at 2732.
86. The Court in another place refers to "cumulative or synergistic" impact of multiple projects. 96 S. Ct. at 2730. See text accompanying note 69 supra. "Synergistic"
certainly makes more sense.
One federal court has already cited Kleppe as recognizing that a comprehensive
EIS will be necessary where proposed federal actions will have a cumulative or synergistic impact upon an area. The court in that case further stated that the requirement for
a programmatic statement will depend upon the facts of each case. Minnesota PIRG
v. Butz, 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1220, 1232 (8th Cir. 1976).
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In the latter case, the ultimate plan will be a selection of the projects
that will maximize development while minimizing the cumulative adverse environmental impacts. The Court's analysis of these factorsalternatives and cumulative impacts-indicated a failure to understand
this twofold purpose.
Furthermore, any consideration of factors relevant to programmatic statements is meaningless unless such considerations are made
at a time early enough for the choice of alternatives to be more than
an academic exercise. Natural resource planning and development require sophisticated and systematic assessments of, alternative resources,
alternative sources of the same resource, and, the environmental impacts of all comparable resources and of all alternative sources. That
job as envisioned by the founders of NEPA was not intended to be
easy, but as supplies of resources have decreased, the job has become
more necessary; as information technology has increased, the job has
become more possible.
The analysis in Kleppe may have dealt a serious blow to the future
impact of NEPA. With a narrowly drawn exception87 programmatic
impact statements are not necessary unless there is a "recommendation
or report on proposals" for programs, a prerequisite that may be
avoided easily enough by federal officials whose primary goals are
often in conflict with environmental concerns. In the absence of a
program, there is the possibility, albeit remote, of showing that the
federal official acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to require
a programmatic EIS for projects pending at the same time.
The Court, therefore, has made an exception to SCRAP II by
requiring an EIS under certain circumstances even in the absence of
a proposed program. Although the Court successfully escaped the
literalism of that opinion, it fell into a different trap: it succumbed to
agency pressures and restricted the planning mandate of NEPA by
narrowly construing the necessity of a programmatic environmental
impact statement. Instead of imposing that restriction, the Court
should have begun the long and difficult formulation of standards that
will force agencies, before the fact, to develop comprehensive national
and regional plans and impact statements that will allow maximum
87. The exception is that when several project proposals having cumulative or synergistic impacts upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency a programmatic EIS is necessary. In the absence of a federal program, therefore, programmatic
impact statements, according to the Court, do not cross regional boundaries and are confined to projects pending at the same time and before the same agency.
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resource development with minimal environmental impacts. Longrange planning is the mandate of NEPA that has been ignored because
of the initial high cost to governmental agencies in traditional terms of

agency output.

In the long run, however, this command of NEPA

should provide the impetus for the most effective resource management

program possible.
ELIZABETH GORDON MCCRODDEN

Interstate Commerce-A Shipper's Remedy for Discrimination
Prohibited by the Motor Carrier Act
Section 216(d)I of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935' (Part II of the

Interstate Commerce Act) makes it unlawful for a regulated3 carrier
to subject a shipper "to any unjust discrimination." 4 There have been
few cases in which the federal judiciary has been required to interpret
the nondiscrimination language contained in section 216(d) and thus

it has remained a relatively obscure provision of a major federal regulatory act. However, the recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.6

may signal the emergence of section 216(d) as an important weapon
in the legal arsenal of shippers. In this case of first impression,
the Fourth Circuit, relying exclusively on the reasoning of cases
interpreting a similar provisionr of the Federal Aviation Act of
1. 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970).
2. Id. §§ 301-327.
3. Some motor carriers, including school busses, taxicabs and farm vehicles, are
excluded from the Act's coverage. Id. § 303(b).
4. Id. § 316(d). This section provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable
preference.or advantage to any particular person, port, gateway, locality, region, district, territory, or description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or
to subject any particular person, port, gateway, locality, region, district, territory, or description of traffic to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever ....
5.' See note 33 infra for a discussion of the cases that have interpreted section
216(d)'s prohibition of discriminatory conduct.
6. 540 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970). This section provides:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality,
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1958,8 found that an implied damage remedy' is available to a shipper
for a carrier's breach of its statutory duty of nondiscrimination. 10 Moreover, the court decided that in a proper case punitive damages can
be assessed against the breaching carrier."
Plaintiffs in Hubbard, a law professor and his wife, had contracted
with defendant motor carrier to have their furniture picked up at New
Haven, Connecticut and delivered to Columbia, South Carolina by a
certain date.'
Most of the furniture was delivered approximately
three weeks after the date specified by the contract while the remainder arrived eleven weeks overdue.' 3 Plaintiffs brought suit in federal
district court' 4 alleging that defendant had violated its section 216(d)
duty of nondiscrimination by using its facilities to transport the goods
"of other unknown persons instead of plaintiffs' goods . . . ."15 They
further alleged' 6 that this was done "in a reckless, wilfull, and wanton
manner" and sought $25,000 in actual and punitive damages.17 Dear description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
8. Id. §§ 1301-1542.
9. The phrase "implied damage remedy" is used in this Note to mean the implication of a private cause of action from a statute not expressly providing one in favor of
the plaintiff.
10. 540 F.2d at 1226.
11. Id. at 1229. The Fourth Circuit also held that damages for mental distress
could be recovered in an action brought under section 216(d) of the Motor Carrier Act.
Id. at 1230. See note 16 infra.
12. 540 F.2d at 1225.
13. Id. The date named in the contract was July 18, 1973. Eighty percent of the
furniture was delivered on August 8, 1973 and the remaining twenty percent on October
10, 1973.
14. Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 74-1819 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 1975) (unreported).
15. 540 F.2d at 1226.
16. Plaintiffs also alleged a right to recover damages for mental distress. They
argued that defendant's conduct forced them to delay setting up their new home and
thereby caused them to suffer compensable anxiety. Id. at 1225. The district court
granted defendant's motion to strike all mention of damages for mental distress from
the complaint on the grounds that recovery of such damages was precluded by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970), see note 74 and text accompanying notes
74-77 infra, and by the fact that there was no precedent for an award of damages for
mental distress for delay in shipping property. Order of the Dist. Ct., No. 74-1819, reproduced in-Brief for Appellant at 7a; see 540 F.2d at 1226. The Fourth Circuit vacated
this order, holding that damages for mental distress due to delay in shipment are recoverable and that plaintiffs should have been allowed to take this question to the jury. The
controlling inquiry, according to the court, was whether the claim could withstand "'a
careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting [it]'" and not be considered trivial or fictitious. 540 F.2d at 1229 (quoting W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRTs § 12, at 51 (1971)).
17. Id. at 1226.
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fendant's preanswer motion to strike from the complaint the portion
that described its conduct as reckless, wilfull and wanton was granted by
the district court's on the ground that recovery of punitive damages for
injury to property was precluded by the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 9 a common law case. An
agreed stipulation of actual damages was entered as judgment. 20
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the order of the district
court and remanded the case for further proceedings. 2 In so doing,
the court found it necessary to face a threshold issue that the district
court had not perceived as an obstacle to recovery: whether plaintiffs
had a cause of action against defendant on the basis of section
216(d).22 Following a line of cases holding that section 404(b) of
the Federal Aviation Act23 implies a private damage remedy in favor
of a passenger who is denied his confirmed reservation on an airline
flight, 24 the Fourth Circuit concluded that a remedy is similarly implied
by section 216(d).2 5 On the question of punitive damages, the court
again adopted the reasoning of the Federal Aviation Act cases, holding
that punitive damages are a possibility in the section 216(d) action and
that plaintiffs should have been allowed to take their evidence of malicious conduct to the jury.2 6 The court rejected the contention of
defendant that the Carmack Amendment, 7 a limitation of liability provision contained in Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act28 that is
applicable to motor carriers but not to air carriers, 29 prevents the
recovery of punitive damages.30 The Fourth Circuit also dismissed
18. Order of the Dist. Ct., reproduced in Brief for Appellant at 7a.
19. 374 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967). This case held that a shipper could not recover
punitive damages in an action for destruction of the shipper's furniture by the carrier.
Id. at 137.
20. 540 F.2d at 1226. This stipulation included "out-of-pocket expenses and damages for loss and breakage of property. ... "- Id.
21. id. at 1230.
22. Id. at 1226.
23. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970). Section 404(b) is codified at id. § 1374(b).
24. See note 52 and text accompanying notes 52-59 infra for a discussion of these
cases.
25. 540 F.2d at 1226.
26. Id. at 1229.
27. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970). See note 74 and text accompanying notes 7477 infra.
28. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-300 (1970). Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act deals generally with the regulation of railroads.
29. Id. § 319. This section incorporates the Carmack Amendment into Part II
(motor carriers) of the Interstate Commerce Act. There is no similar provision with
respect to the Federal Aviation Act.
30. 540 F.2d at 1228.

500

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Chandler31 as inapplicable because it "was an action based on the common law liability of a carrier for damage to goods in transit, not a dis32
crimination case brought under [section 216 (d)].
Since Hubbard was a case of first impression, there was no body
of case law interpreting the antidiscrimination provision of section
216(d) upon which the court could have based its holding."3 There-

fore, in order to place this decision in the appropriate perspective, it
is necessary to examine both the test developed by the courts to deter-

mine when it is proper to imply a private cause of action under a federal statute and the cases that have dealt with this question in the context of other provisions of the Motor Carrier Act and section 404(b)
of the Federal Aviation Act. In regard to the issue of punitive damages, the section 404(b) cases and the interpretation of the Carmack

Amendment constitute the relevant background.
A private damage remedy was first implied from a federal statute
in 1916 in Texas & Pacific Railroad v. Rigsby,34 a case in which the

United States Supreme Court enunciated a broadly inclusive test for
implication. The Court held that a cause of action arose by implication
when a member of "the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted" was damaged as a result of a violation of the statute.35

Since

1916 this test has been subject to a series of modifications and obfuscations36 that have successively restricted 7 and broadened 8 the applica31. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
32. 540 F.2d at 1229.
33. Although the court stated: "We have found no case discussing the issue of
whether a private damage remedy will lie for breach of the duty imposed by this section," id. at 1226, there is at least one case that has considered this issue. Lyons v.
Illinois Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951), held that a black woman
who was forced to give up her seat and move to the rear of the bus had an action under
section 216(d) for the physical injuries she suffered. Id. at 534. This case has not
been widely cited and, because of the difference in factual bases, should not be considered as a possible precedent for the holding in Hubbard. Another case, Merchandise
Warehouse Co. v. A.B.C. Freight Forwarding Corp., 165 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Ind. 1958),
discussed section 216(d) in regard to discrimination and held that plaintiff had a cause
of action against a freight forwarder (who was regulated by section 216(d)) for his refusal to cross picket lines at plaintiff's place of business and deliver goods. It is unclear,
however, whether the action was based on section 216(d) or the common law.
34. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
35. Id. at 39.
36. See generally Comment, Private Rights of Action under Amtrak and Ash:
Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1393-97 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Public Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246 (1951), which found that the implication of a private damage remedy was improper when the express provisions of the statute were limited to prospective relief.
38. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), which held that a private damage remedy is implied to carry out the congressional purpose of protecting federal rights.
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bility of the implication doctrine. In Cort v. Ash,3 9 the Supreme Court
clarified the state of the doctrine and indicated a move in the direction

of the more restrictive view of when a private right of action is
implied.4 0 The Court held that a stockholder does not have an implied

cause of action against the directors of a corporation for violation of
a federal statute41 that prohibits dispersal of corporate funds in connection with a federal election.42

In reaching this conclusion the Court

outlined the relevant pattern of inquiry in deciding the question of
implication as: 1) whether the statute was enacted especially to benefit

a class of which plaintiff is a member; 2) whether there was an expression of legislative intent that a private damage remedy be implied or

denied; 3) whether such a remedy is "consistent with the legislative
scheme"; and 4) whether the action involved is one more appropriately
left to the states.4

Although section 216(d)'s prohibition of unjust discrimination has
not been conclusively interpreted, another provision of the same section

of the Motor Carrier Act has been examined by the Supreme Court.
In T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 44 the Court held that the language
of section 216(d) making it unlawful for a carrier to charge unjust6
4
rates45 does not imply a cause of action for recovery of overcharges.

The Court based its decision on the conclusion that since such an action

was expressly provided for in Parts I (railroads) 47 and III (water
carriers) 48 of the Interstate Commerce Act, the legislative intent in
regard to Part II (motor carriers) 49 was to deny the remedy. 50 In
39. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
40. See Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Amtrak and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 53 (1976).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
42. 422 U.S. at 69.
43. id. at 78.
44. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
45. 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970), which remains unchanged since the time the case
was decided, provides in pertinent part that:
All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered by any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce in the
transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid or in connection therewith
shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such
service or any part thereof, is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.
46. 359 U.S. at 472. Cf. Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 1069
(10th Cir. 1976) (Federal Aviation Act provision barring an air carrier from charging
more than the rates and charges specified in the carrier's tarrifs does not create an implied cause of action in passengers who are overcharged).
47. 49 U.S.C. § 1-300 (1970).
48. Id. H9 901-923.
49. Id. § 301-327.
50. 359 U.S. at 470-71. The Court also relied on the failure of Congress to enact
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1965, six years after the decision in T.I.M.E. was announced, Congress
reacted by amending the Motor Carrier Act to provide an action to
recover overcharges. 51

As to the existence of an implied cause of action under section
404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.5 2 that "it

is well settled that a private damage action is available to remedy violations of this provision."5 One of the principal cases that underlied
the Nader court's assumption that the question of implication under section 404(b) had been answered was Wills v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc.514 In that case plaintiff made and confirmed a reservation on
defendant's flight.

However, since defendant had "overbooked" '

5

the

board.50

flight, plaintiff was not allowed to
The District Court for the
Southern District of California, after finding that defendant's actions
had reached the level of unjust discrimination prohibited by the
statute, 57 concluded that a cause of action was implied in plaintiff's
amendments to Part II suggested by the Interstate Commerce Commission that would
have expressly provided this remedy. Id. at 471-72.
51. Congress passed Act of Sept. 6, 1965, Pub. L. No. 83-170, § 6, 79 Stat. 648
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) (2), (5) (1970)), to provide this remedy.
52. 512 F.2d. 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1978
(1976). In this case, plaintiff was not allowed to board defendant's flight even though
he held a confirmed reservation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging
both section 404(b) and common law misrepresentation causes of action. The district
court allowed him to recover on the basis of both of these claims. 365 F. Supp. 128,
132 (D.D.C. 1973). On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the section
404(b) cause of action for further findings of fact, and ordered that the common law
misrepresentation cause be stayed pending a decision by the Civil Aeronautics Board on
the question whether defendant's policy of overbooking flights was a deceptive practice.
512 F.2d at 552. The only issue appealed to the Supreme Court was the correctness
of the District of Columbia Circuit's order to stay proceedings on the misrepresentation
claim, and it was on this issue that the Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia
Circuit. 96 S. Ct. at 1981.
53. 512 F.2d at 537.
54. 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Accord, Archibald v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc,,
229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956); Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.
111 1969).
55. "Overbooking" refers to the standard practice among airlines of selling and
confirming more tickets than there are seats on the airplane. This is done in order to
maximize the number of passengers on flights while, at the same time, allowing ticket
purchasers a great degree of freedom to cancel their reservations without incurring a
penalty. See the District of Columbia Circuit's discussion of this practice in Nader, 512
F.2d at 533-37.
56. 200 F. Supp. at 362. The airline did not allow plaintiff, a tourist class ticketholder, to board, in order to accommodate a first-class passenger in the tourist section.
57. Id. at 365. This does not mean that every instance in which a passenger holding a confirmed reservation is denied a seat is a per se violation of section 404(b). 512
F.2d at 538. Airlines are required by an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 14
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The basis for the holding in Wills was that the Federal

Aviation Act only provided measures to insure future complicance with
the statute and without implication of a private cause of action the antidiscrimination provision "would be robbed of vitality and the purposes

of the Act substantially thwarted.""5
A more recent case involving section 404(b) is Polansky v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. 60 in which the Third Circuit held that passengers
who had alleged discrimination in the quality of ground services provided by the defendant airline 6 did not have a remedy implied by sec-

tion 404(b).62 In reaching this result the court noted that a remedy
had been properly implied under section 404(b) in the overbooking

cases6" but concluded that the factors set out by the Supreme Court
in Cort v. Ash precluded implication of a remedy in this case.64 While

the Third Circuit premised its holding on the impropriety of implying
a remedy in this instance, the true basis for the result appears to be
plaintiffs' failure to allege conduct that violated section 404(b).6 5 In

determining what constituted discrimination under the statute, the
Polansky court stated that it is "discriminatory denial of access to air
facilities . . .which is critical." 66 The court concluded that the air-

line's actions amounted only to breach of a contract of service, which
left plaintiffs with an action on the contract under appropriate state law
but did not allow them access to the federal courts under section
404(b).

If the breach of contract by defendant in Polansky were

viewed as discrimination condemned by the statute, the Third Circuit
speculated that "It]here would always be another unbreached contract

to which the disgruntled air passenger could compare the services perC.F.R. § 250.3 (1976), to "establish and enforce nondiscriminatory priority rules" to
determine who should be seated when a flight is overbooked. 512 F.2d at 538. In order
to make out a case of unjust discrimination, a passenger must allege "(1) that [he] possessed a designated priority, and (2) that the carrier boarded persons with a lower priority . . . ." Id.
58. 200 F. Supp. at 365.
59. Id. at 364.
60. 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 333. Plaintiffs were part of a tour sponsored by defendant airline. They
claimed that their "first class" hotel accommodations were inferior to those provided to
other members of the tour at tourist rates. Id.
62. Id. at 338.
63. Id. at 335. See note 52 and text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
64. 523 F.2d at 335-36. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
65. The Third Circuit stated that: "[tihe words of the statute and the decided
cases suggest that (section 404(b)] does not seek to prevent the harm alleged by these
plaintiff-appellants." 523 F.2d at 336.
66. Id.
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a federal remedy
formed for him" and section 404(b) would provide 67
for every violation of a contract of service by an airline.
Apart from section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, there
have been few developments in the area of punitive damages in implied
rights of action under federal statutes.68

In Wills such damages were

assessed against defendant on the theory that since punitive damages
are a possibility in common law tort actions, they are also available when
a statutory cause of action sounds in tort."'

The court enunciated the

purposes served by punitive damages as being to vindicate the right of
plaintiff and to deter similar conduct by "supplement[ing] the criminal
and in futuro remedial provisions of the Act .

.

...

Nader, while

refusing to allow punitive damages because of a failure of proof of malicious conduct by defendant airline, 7 did not reject the holding in Wills
that such damages can be properly awarded in an implied action under
section 404(b). 72 The Nader opinion, however, questioned the extent
to which deterrence can be used as a justification for allowing punitive
damages without infringing upon the primary jurisdiction of the Civil
73
Aeronautics Board.

A provision of the Motor Carrier Act that could affect the
availability of punitive damages in a section 216(d) action is the Car-

mack Amendment.74 The essence of this section is that a motor carrier
67. Id.
68. Punitive damages have been awarded in an implied action under section 10(b)
of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). See generally Note,
Punitive Damages in Implied Actions for Fraud Under the Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL
L. REV. 646 (1970).
69. 200 F. Supp. at 367.
70. Id. at 368.
71. In Wills, the requisite degree of malicious conduct was established by defendant's intentional violation of its priority rules in favoring a first class ticketholder over
plaintiff and by the fact that the overbooking could be characterized as substantial. Id.
at 367. While it is arguable that the overbooking in Nader was also substantial, the
court held that if there had been a violation of defendant's priority rules, it was not intentional and therefore could not be construed as malicious. 512 F.2d at 550.
72. 512 F.2d at 550.
73. Nader intimates that, if the courts award punitive damages in order to force
the airlines to end the practice of overbooking, they have infringed upon the primary
jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board first to consider the propriety of airline policies. Id.
74. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970), made applicable to Part II (motor carriers) of
the Interstate Commerce Act by id. § 319, provides in pertinent part:
Any common carrier

. . .

receiving property for transporation .

shall

be liable . . . for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it
. and any such common carrier

. . .

shall be liable

loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it.

. . .

.

for the full actual

. notwithstanding any
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accepting goods for transport must issue a bill of lading to the shipper

that establishes the issuing carrier's responsibility for the goods during
the entire time they are in transit.

While the Carmack Amendment

establishes a limitation on liability when a carrier files a value based
tariff with the Interstate Commerce Commission, its main purpose is

not to limit the carrier's liability, but rather to provide the shipper with
a readily available source of recovery. 75 The amendment could be
construed as a roadblock to recovery of punitive damages in that its language states that a carrier "shall be liable . . . for the full actual loss,
damage, or injury to such property ....
While a technical inter-

pretation of "actual" and "to such property" might possibly lead to the
conclusion that punitive damages are precluded by the Carmack
77
Amendment, the courts have refrained from such a literal reading.

The significance of the Hubbard decision is its invigoration of the
Motor Carrier Act's dormant antidiscrimination provision. The Fourth

Circuit added substance to the mere words of the congressional enactment by implying a cause of action for a violation of section 216(d)
that carries with it the possibility of a punitive damage award. Without
such an implied remedy, a shipper suffering unjust discrimination at
the hands of a carrier would be left to bring suit for breach of contract,

an action in which actual damages
are likely to be small 78 and punitive
79
damages generally unavailable.
An analysis of the reasoning in Hubbard begins with an iiquiry
into the soundness of the court's reliance on section 404(b) precedent.
While the language of sections 216(d) and 404(b) is substantially the

same, and they are both parts of regulatory acts governing common carriers, the Hubbard situation can be distinguished from the section

404(b) overbooking cases on the basis that it involved discrimination
against property rather than against people. The Fourth Circuit merely
limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation
or agreement as to value in any. . . receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract,
rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which
it is sought to be made is declared to be unlawful and void ....
75. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 199-203 (1911).
76. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970).
77. See Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936);
New York, P. & N.R.R. v. Peninsula Exch., 240 U.S. 34 (1916). These cases were cited
in the Hubbardopinion. 540 F.2d at 1227.
78. In Wills, actual damages amounted to only $1.54. 200 F. Supp. at 367.
79. Plaintiffs in Hubbard sought punitive damages on the basis of defendant's
breach of contract. Brief for Appellant at 28, Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540
F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1976), but the court's failure to consider this claim in the opinion
evidences the amount of credence generally given to such an argument.
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states in conclusory terms that this distinction is not valid,80 but the
court could have supported its conclusion by citing the language of
other provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. The Act regulates transportation of both freight and people81 and makes certain provisions
expressly applicable to only one of these categories.8 It is significant
that parts of section 216 apply only to "carrier[s] of passengers"8' 3 or
"carrier[s] of property"8 4 while section 216(d) contains no such limita85
tion.
Although the section 404(b) overbooking cases provide a valid

argument for implication of a remedy in Hubbard, the Fourth Circuit
could have augmented the persuasiveness of its decision on this issue
by also considering the impact of the four factors set out by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.86 Such an analysis would have been
highly relevant because the section 404(b) cases upon which the
Hubbard court placed exclusive reliance either preceded the Supreme
Court's tightening of the implication doctrine in Cort or ignored that
decision altogether.
The requirement, first stated in Texas & Pacific Railroad and
restated in Cort, that plaintiff be "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, '8 7 presents no real problem for implication of a shipper's action under section 216(d). The Motor Carrier
Act represents "a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant class

. . ."

and thus

places a shipper in the benefited position.88
The second Cort factor, the existence of legislative intent either
to create or to deny a remedy, is not so readily overcome. While the
legislative history, like the Motor Carrier Act itself, is silent on the
matter of a private damage remedy in favor of a shipper for a violation
of section 216(d)'s nondiscrimination provision, the Supreme Court's
holding in T.I.M.E. could be advanced to support a conclusion that congressional silence evidenced an intent that there be no implied
remedy.8 9 Discrimination in service, like charging unjust rates, is pro80. 540 F.2d at 1226.

81. 49 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1970).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See statutes cited notes 83 & 84 infra.
49 U.S.C. § 316(a) (1970).
Id. §§ 316(b), (c).
Id. § 316(d) is applicable to "any common carrier by motor vehicle."
523 F.2d at 335-36; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
241 U.S. at 39.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
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hibited and a private right of action is expressly provided to redress
such a violation in Parts I (railroads) 9" and III (water carriers) 91 of
the Interstate Commerce Act. However, the Fourth Circuit could
possibly have escaped from the meaning that T.I.M.E. drew from

congressional silence by finding an expression of legislative intent in
the 1965 amendment to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act (motor

carriers) that expressly provides the remedy sought by plaintiff in
T.I.M.E.02 While this amendment only provides a remedy for overcharges, it could nevertheless be viewed as expressing an intent that

the remedies under Part II be the same as those provided in Parts I
and III of the Interstate Commerce Act.93

An examination of the third Cort factor, whether implication is

"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme," 9 4
supports the result reached in Hubbard. The Motor Carrier Act was

passed in order to regulate a rapidly growing industry. The aim of
regulation was not only to protect carriers from the unbridled competi-

tion of other carriers and the railroads from the competition of an
unregulated mode of transport, but also to protect shippers from being

damaged by the conditions that chaotic competition nurtured.9" Thus,
implication of a remedy in favor of a shipper under section 216(d)
furthers a primary purpose of the Act.

Whether Hubbardimplied a remedy that is "traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States""6 and

thus violated the final Cort requirement is unclear. Polansky indicated
90. 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970) prohibits discrimination and id. §§ 8 & 9 expressly
provide for an action in the federal courts.
91. Id. § 905(c) prohibits discrimination and id. § 908(c) expressly provides an
action in the federal courts.
92. Pub. L. No. 89-170, 79 Stat. 648 (1965) (codified in scattered sections of 49

U.S.C.).
93. See Letter from Charles A. Webb to Oren Harris, March 29, 1965, reprinted
CONG. & AD. NEws 2939. This letter was written by the chairman
of the Interstate Commerce Commission at the request of the House of Representatives
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to justify the amendment of 49 U.S.C.
§ 304(a). The letter stated:
The Motor Carrier industry has attained stature and stability as one of
the chief agencies of public transportation, handling a substantial volume of
the Nation's traffic. It seems appropriate, therefore, that shippers should have
the same rights of recovery against motor carriers as they have against rail and
water carriers for violations of the act.
Id. at 2940.
94. 422 U.S. at 78.
95. S. Rep. No. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). The report stated that "[the]
present chaotic transportation conditions are not satisfactory to investors, labor, shippers, or the carriers themselves." Id. at 2.
96. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).

in [1965] U.S. CODE
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that the overbooking cases complied with this stricture because "federal
regulatory control" in the area of boarding priority is total and thus
without implication of a federal remedy a bumped passenger would
have no action at ally 7 The total control exercised by the Civil Aeronautics Board distinguishes the section 404(b) cases from section
216(d) as there is no similar degree of control exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This difference, however, should not
lead to the automatic conclusion that implication is improper under section 216(d). The Cort opinion itself cast a significant degree of doubt
on the importance of this factor in relation to the first three by recognizing that in some instances state law will be supplemented by implied
federal actions in order to avoid frustration of the congressional intent
behind the particular statute-"
While the Hubbard court's finding that a private cause of action
is implicit in section 216(d) is highly significant, the court left the ultimate importance of its decision in doubt by choosing not to resolve the
question of what constitute the proper elements of this cause of
action.99 It is clear from the text of section 216(d) that unjust discrimination must be alleged, but this conclusion merely leads to a more
difficult inquiry into what is meant by unjust discrimination. Hubbard's
reference to the discussion in Nader of the elements of a section
404(b) cause of action' 00 is not directly helpful. Nader held that a
prima facie case of unjust discrimination is established when an air carrier violates its own priority rules and boards a passenger with a priority lower than that of the person claiming discrimination.101 Since
motor carriers are not required to establish priority rules, a section
216(d) action cannot be alleged in these terms. However, Polansky
illuminates this problem in relation to section 216(d) by interpreting
the Nader requirement that priority rules be violated as meaning that
denial of access to the carrier's facilities is necessary to make out a case
of unjust discrimination. 1 2 Thus, plaintiffs in Hubbard face the
prospect that, on remand, the district court will hold that they failed
to allege the elements of a section 216(d) cause of action because the
conduct that they attribute to defendant amounts to a poor performance
97. 523 F.2d at 338.
98. 422 U.S. at 85.
99. 540 F.2d at 1226 n.1.
100. Id.

101. 512 F.2d at 538. See note 57 supra.
102. 523 F.2d at 336.
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of its contractual duties but not a discriminatory denial of access to its
transport facilities.
An analysis of the Hubbard decision on the issue of punitive damages focuses on the court's conclusion that section 404(b) damages
precedent is applicable and controlling. The Fourth Circuit presents
a strong case based on statutory interpretation and policy considerations for not precluding punitive damages on the basis of the Carmack
Amendment.'0 3 In contrast, the court's basis for distinguishing its
holding in Chandler is not so convincing. Although Chandler did in
fact involve a common law rather than a statutory claim, this distinction
should not control the availability of punitive damages in light of the
fact that the theoretical justification for such an award in a statutory
104
claim is that punitive damages are available in a common law action.
A better reason for distinguishing Chandler is that it does not really
concern the issue of punitive damages.' 0 5
The Hubbardcourt's recognition of an implied cause of action with
a possibility of punitive damages under section 216(d) was a reasonable exercise of judicial interpretation of a statute. Implication of this
remedy promotes the just result that the rights of persons subjected to
unjust discrimination in contravention of the public policy expressed in
section 216(d) are recognized and safeguarded in the federal courts.
The critical weakness of the Hubbard decision, however, is its failure
to perceive that, although implication of a section 216(d) cause of
action is valid, the facts of the case before the court clearly revealed
that there was no discrimination. Instead of avoiding the question of
the elements of the cause of action, the Fourth Circuit should have held
that discriminatory denial of access to the carrier's facilities is necessary
to constitute discrimination under section 216(d).
GEORGE H.

MASTERSON

103. 540 F.2d at 1247-48.
104. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
105. The facts of the Chandler case centered around the existence of a disputed bill
of lading. Punitive damages were not mentioned until the next to the last paragraph
of the opinion where the court stated in conclusory terms that they were unavailable
and cited the Carmack Amendment and four cases. 374 F.2d at 137. None of these
cases involved allegations of malicious conduct on the part of carriers and requests for
punitive damages, but rather all were concerned with the general rule for computing the
shipper's actual damages when a carrier has made faulty performance of his contractual
obligations. The cases cited in Chandler are Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas Packing Co.,
244 U.S. 31 (1917); Stackpole Motor Transport, Inc. v. Maiden Spinning & Dyeing Co.,
263 F.2d 47 (lst Cir. 1958); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Rouw Co., 258 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.
1958); Illinois Cen. R.R. v. Zucchero, 221 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1955).
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Taxation-Promissory Notes Held Not To Be Appropriate Form
of "Payment" to Profit-Sharing Plan
Section 404(a) of the Internal Revenue Code' allows an employer
to deduct on its tax return payments made to a qualified pension or
profit-sharing plan, within limits as to the amount.2 Under section
404(a)(6), this deduction is available if the liability is incurred within
the taxable year and actual payment is made within the deadline for
filing tax returns;' however, uncertainty has arisen as to what satisfies
the "payment" requirement of this section of the Code. Recently the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner,4 held that delivery of a secured, interest-bearing, demand promissory note within the period prescribed by statute to the trustees of a
qualified employee profit-sharing plan established by a company
did not entitle the company to a deduction for the contribution under
the statute. 5
1. I.R.C. § 404(a) reads as follows:
(a) General Rule.-If contributions are paid by an employer to or
under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or if compensation is paid or accrued on account of any employee under a plan deferring the
receipt of such compensation, such contributions or compensation shall not be
deductible under section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses) or section
212 (relating to expenses for the production of income); but, if they satisfy
the conditions of either of such sections, they shall be deductible under this
section, subject, however, to . . . limitations as to the amounts deductible in
any year.
2. The limits as to amount are set forth in I.R.C. § 404(a) (1) (pension trusts),
§ 404(a)(2) (employees' annuities) and § 404(a)(3) (stock bonus and profit-sharing
trusts).
3. I.R.C. § 404(a) (6) provides as follows:
(6) Time when contributions deemed made.-For purposes of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), a taxpayer shall be deemed to have made a payment
on the last day of the preceding taxable year if the payment is on account of
such taxable year and is made not later than the time prescribed by law for
filing the return for such taxable year (including extensions thereof).
Before 1974, I.R.C. § 404(a) (6) applied only to accrual basis taxpayers:
(6) Taxpayers on accrual basis.-For purposes of paragraphs (1),
(2), and (3), a taxpayer on the accrual basis shall be deemed to have made
a payment on the last day of the year of accrual if the payment is on account
of such taxable year and is made not later than the time prescribed by law
for filing the return for such taxable year (including extensions thereof).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 138, 141.
The change in the language of § 404(a) (6) was included in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.). As a result, cash basis taxpayers
are allowed the same grace period for making payment previously afforded only accrual
basis taxpayers.
4. 527 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1975), af!'d, 45 U.S.L.W. 4160 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
5. Id. at 653. See generally Brandis, The Treatment Accorded Promissory Notes
Under the Federal Income Tax, 52 N.C.L. REv. 93 (1973).
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For each of three taxable years 6 the Williams Company, an accrual
basis taxpayer, had entered a liability on its books for contributions to
the employee profit-sharing fund established by the company)' Instead of making payment in cash before expiration of the statutory
grace period, the company in each of the three years delivered to the
trustees a secured, interest-bearing demand note for the amount of the
liability.8 Collateral for the notes consisted of shares of stock in the
company and interests of two of the shareholders of the plan. The
value of the collateral, it was stipulated, exceeded the face amount of
the notes for each of the three taxable years;1" nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit, affirming the Tax Court,11 reasoned that the statute
contemplates a form of "payment" more akin to cash than a promissory
note and accordingly upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of the
12
deduction.
A primary source of authority utilized by the Williams court
was a 1932 Supreme Court decision, Eckert v. Burnet,'3 which established conclusively that the issuance of a cash basis taxpayer's
promissory note is not the equivalent of payment.14 Thus, the issue
presented to the court was whether, in light of Eckert, accrual basis taxpayers are to be distinguished from cash basis taxpayers with regard
to promissory notes; the Williams court could find no such distinction.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court cited a 1948 House Ways and
Means Committee Report that stated, "[a]n employer on the accrual
basis of accounting may under existing law deduct contributions actually
paid within the first 60 days of the subsequent year."' 5 The Committee's use of the phrase "actually paid" intimated a congressional intent
to require a "liquid form of payment and not a promissory note
...

,11

On the basis of this legislative guidance, coupled with the

absence of any language in the statute distinguishing cash and accrual
basis taxpayers, Williams refused to follow the holdings of courts of
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(1948))
16.

The taxable years involved were 1967, 1968 and 1969.
527 F.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Tax Court opinion is reported at 62 T.C. 166 (1974).
527 F.2d at 651.
283 U.S. 140 (1931).
Id. at 141.
527 F.2d at 651 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(emphasis in original).
Id.
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appeals of three other circuits and ruled instead that promissory notes
17
are not an acceptable form of payment.
The controversy concerning the use of promissory notes as an
acceptable medium of payment to pension and profit-sharing plans first
arose in 1949 under the statutory predecessor 8 to section 404(a)(6).
In Logan Engineering Co.'" the Tax Court found that the issuance and
delivery of negotiable, interest-bearing notes was not a sufficient mode
of payment.20 Since Logan., three federal courts of appeals have
addressed the issue and all three have overruled the Tax Court's position. 2 1 The first reversals came in 1953 in the companion cases of
Sachs v. Commissioner and Slaymaker v. Commissioner,2 two cases
with essentially identical fact patterns in which the taxpayers delivered
a "negotiable demand note made payable at a bank to the trustee of
its exempt employees' pension trust. '2 3 The Third Circuit accepted
the promissory note as payment in Slaymaker because of undisputed
evidence of the company's solvency; the court remanded the Sachs case
for a factual determination by the Tax Court of whether that corporation was solvent.24 In Sachs the court found that on the basis of cases
interpreting another section of the Code2 1 in which promissory notes
were deemed adequate forms of payment, "'payment' or 'paid' does
not invariably mean 'in cash.' "26 The court reasoned that negotiable
notes are, under contemporary commercial law, very similar to checks,
27
which are undoubtedly an acceptable form of payment.
Undaunted by these reversals, the Tax Court held firm to its
17. Id. at 653.
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(p)(1), 53 Stat. 15, as amended by Revenue
Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 865 (similar provisions now contained in
I.R.C. § 404(a)).
19. 12 T.C. 860 (1949).
20. Id. at 868.
21. Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963); Time
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958); Sachs v. Commissioner, 208
F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1953). Additionally, two federal district cburts have reached similar
conclusions: Advance Constr. Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. 111. 1972);
Steele Wholesale Builders Supply Co. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Tex.
1963).
22. The two cases were combined and the decision for both is reported at 208 F.2d
313 (3d Cir. 1953).
23. Id. at 314.
24. Id. at 316.
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(b) (1) (A), 53 Stat. 16 (similar provisions
now contained in I.R.C. § 267).
26. 208 F.2d at 315.
27. Id.
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position when the issue next arose in 1956 in Time Oil Co.' s Once
again the Tax Court was reversed-this time by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.29 When the issue was presented again in 1962 in Wasatch
Chemical Co.3 ° the Tax Court attempted to distinguish Slaymaker and
Time Oil Co. from the facts in Wasatch on the ground that the notes
given in the two earlier cases were demand notes, whereas the notes
given in Wasatch were five year term notes. 3 Consequently, the court
held that the term notes did not possess sufficient similarity to a check
as did the demand notes in Slaymaker.3 2 This distinction did not persuade the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals-the Tax Court was again
reversed upon appeal.33 In spite of these reversals, the Tax Court in
Williams reaffirmed the rationale that it first enunciated in Logan.3 4
Finally, in Williams the Tax Court and the Commissioner reaped the
fruits of their perseverence-an affirmance by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 5
Other than the 1948 House Ways and Means Committee Report
cited by Williams,3 6 there is no congressional guidance on the issue
of what constitutes payment for the purposes of section 404(a)(6).
As a result courts have been forced to choose between strict statutory
construction on the one hand, exemplified by the Eckert court's interpretation of "payment, '3 T and a more lenient result brought about
through liberal construction on the other hand, as was done in the Third,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits.3 The Williams court opted for a strict statutory construction of the "payment" requirement, finding no basis in the
statute to distinguish between cash and accrual method taxpayers regarding the use of promissory notes as an acceptable form of payment.3
Eckert v. Burnet had established the notion that, with regard to cash
method taxpayers, 40 promissory notes are not an appropriate mode of
"payment" in the context of a deduction for a bad debt: "[a] dededuction may be permissible in the taxable year in which the peti28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
(1948)).
37.
38.
39.
40.

26 T.C. 1061 (1956).
Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958).
37 T.C. 817 (1962).
Id. at 819-20.
Id.
Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843, 847 (10th Cir. 1963).
62 T.C. at 168.
See text accompanying notes 4, 5, 10-12 supra.
527 F.2d at 651 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 140, 141-42 (1931).
See text accompanying notes 21-35 supra.
527 F.2d at 650-51.
283 U.S. 140 (1931), discussed in text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
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tioner pays cash."41 Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit in
Williams, if accrual method taxpayers are to be treated like cash
method taxpayers, and if promissory notes are not a proper form of payment for cash method taxpayers, it logically follows that the use of
promissory notes is also forbidden for accrual method taxpayers.42
The notion of similarity of treatment between cash and accrual
method taxpayers under section 404(a)(6), as presented by the Williams
court, is bolstered by the fact that in other sections of the Code in which
a distinction between the two types of taxpayers is intended the lan43
guage "paid or accrued" or "paid or incurred" is normally employed.
By contrast, in section 404(a)(6) this language is missing; the statute
merely uses the term "paid." The Williams court's distinction based
on contrasting terminology is by no means perfect, however. In at least
one other section of the Code in which the term "paid" is used, 4 the
courts have allowed promissory notes to satisfy the payment requirement.45 The Tax Court has attempted to distinguish between the two
situations in that the sections allowing promissory notes as "payment"
merely limit a deduction already granted, whereas section 404(a)(6)
is an affirmative grant of a deduction and as such is to be more strictly
construed 46 -further indication that something more resembling cash
than a promissory note must be offered as payment.47
Unfortunately the court's reliance on this definition of "paid" or
"payment" does not withstand close examination; even the Tax Court
has admitted that the definition of payment that requires liquidation of
a liability in cash does not foreclose the use of checks as an acceptable
method of payment.48 No one would seriously argue that a check is
anything other than a substitute form of cash, and contemporary commercial law reflects this assumption. The inconsistency of the Tax
Court's position, which rejects promissory notes as payment while
accepting other forms of noncash substitutes as payment, is illustrated
41. 283 U.S. at 141-42 (emphasis added).
42. See 527 F.2d at 651.
43. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 164(a), 174(a)(1), 175(a), 212, 216(a).
44. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(c) (1), 53 Stat. 17 (now I.R.C. § 267).
45. See, e.g., Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.
1947) (promissory note given by a corporation to one of its officers as salary constituted
payment of the salary).
46. The Tax Court first enunciated this position in Logan Eng'r Co., 12 T.C. 860,
868-69 (1949).
47. See 527 F.2d at 651.
48. E.g., in Wasatch Chem. Co., 37 T.C. 817 (1962), the Tax Court stated that
"[tihe act of payment for tax purposes, and generally, may be accomplished by the
transfer of funds directly or by check." Id. at 819.
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further in a decision rendered by the Tax Court in 1958, 49 nine years
after its first promissory note decision5" under section 404(a)(6)'s
predecessor. In Colorado Nationdl Bank5 the taxpayer transferred a
piece of real property to a qualified pension plan in order to satisfy its
obligation for the taxable year in question.52 The Commissioner relied
on the Tax Court's earlier decisions involving promissory notes to argue
that the transfer of land was not a payment in cash or its equivalent
as arguably required by the statute, and accordingly disallowed the
deduction. 53 Rejecting the Commissioner's argument, the Tax Court
found that the taxpayer transferred an income-producing asset with an
ascertainable value to the pension trust and that this payment was
"within the words and intent of the applicable statutory provisions." 5 4
The Seventh Circuit made no mention of Colorado National Bank in
the Williams decision.
Colorado National Bank points out in the context of a transfer
of land what the three circuit courts55 that had ruled on the promissory note issue prior to Williams had emphasized: in certain situations,
promissory notes, like a piece of land or cash or a check, do indeed
have a "value" that can be ascertained. 56 Moreover, promissory notes
also have income-producing capabilities; in two of these cases the notes
paid interest until they were satisfied.5" Indeed in situations involving
negotiable demand notes, there is probably a closer "cash equivalency"
than with a parcel of land.
As suggested in Colorado National Bank and by the Third, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, the most logical approach to the problem is not to
emphasize the form of payment, but rather to inquire whether anything
of value has been transferred; such a determination presents no insurmountable problems. In Slaymaker, for example, the circuit court
found that the notes were worth their face amount.55 This finding was
based on the fact that the corporation was solvent and the notes were
adequately secured. 59 Additionally, the same court remanded the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
Sachs v.
58.
59.

Colorado Nat'1 Bank v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 933 (1958).
See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
30 T.C. 933 (1958).
Id. at 934.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 936.
See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
30 T.C. at 935-36.
Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843, 844 (10th Cir. 1963);
Commissioner, 208 F.2d 313, 314 (3d Cir. 1953).
208 F.2d at 314.
Id.
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Sachs case because no finding was made below on the "value" question. 60 The Slaymaker-Sachs court was not willing to allow promissory
notes per se to satisfy the "value" requirement; instead there was an
inquiry into the underlying worth of the notes.
This "value" approach, first taken by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Sachs and Slaymaker, followed by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and subsequently rejected in Williams is an eminently workable
and sensible approach. As was suggested by the circuit court in Sachs,
findings of fact could easily be made to determine if the notes had any
value. This approach allows the best of both worlds. When a solvent
corporation is temporarily caught in a cash-flow squeeze, contributions
could still be made in the form of notes; the pension plans would not
have to be slighted in that year and the corporation could take a deduction for its contribution. On the other hand, when the notes are of no
value or worth less than their face value, the deduction would properly
be disallowed or reduced. Certainly such an approach does not require
an overly strained interpretation of the statute, and the legislative history on this issue is so scanty as to be meaningless.
Aside from the strict statutory construction applied by the Williams
court, an obvious underlying concern throughout these cases is the protection of the pension and profit-sharing plans from employer contributions of worthless promissory notes. Yet the fact remains that under
the law, trustees of pension and profit-sharing plans are perfectly free
to invest in the stocks and securities of the employer corporation."'
Apparently, such investments are a common practice in many of the
large pension plans. 62 Hence, the value of the plan in such situations
depends ultimately upon the solvency of the corporation. If the corporation's promissory notes are of little or no value, then surely its
securities are not very valuable, and the plan remains in jeopardy.
Allowing trustees to hold securities but not promissory notes makes
60. Id. at 316.
61. Rules concerning investments in employer securities by pension and profitsharing trusts were tightened considerably with the passage of ERISA, cited note 3 supra.
Nevertheless, pension and profit-sharing plans may still invest in employer securities,
within the percentage limitations set forth in § 407(a) (2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1107
(a) (2) (Supp. V 1975), if the security is an "employer security" as defined in ERISA
§ 407(a) (1) (D) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1) (D) (5) (Supp. V 1975). See Sollee &
Shapiro, (ERISA) Profit-sharing Plans-Qualification, 310 TAX MANAGEMENT A-40
(1975); Sollee & Shapiro, (ERISA) Pension Plans-Qualification, 309 TAx MANAGEMENT A-44 (1975).
62. See D. McLAUGHL N, TiE EXECUTIVE MONEY MAP 11 (1975).
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little sense if the ultimate goal is to protect these plans and ensure their

survival.
The issue in the Williams case is a close one and perhaps should
receive specific congressional attention; in the absence of more illumi-

nating congressional guidance, however, encouragement of pension and
profit-sharing plans and the preservation of their integrity demand a

judicial definition of "payment" that includes promissory notes within
its ambit-a broader definition than that adhered to for almost thirty
years by the Tax Court and, more recently, by the Seventh Circuit.

Admittedly this result would have to be achieved at the expense of a
strict statutory construction; however, this broader definition of "pay-

ment" would be tempered by an inquiry into the underlying worth of
the notes as suggested by the Slaymaker-Sachs approach.

This result

would encourage more corporations to adopt or retain pension plans,
which is, after all, the basic purpose of section 404(a).
ALLEN

Zoning -Adjudication

T. WOOD III

by Labels: Referendum Rezoning and

Due Process
In recent years, the use of procedural devices providing for direct
citizen participation' in land use planning decisions has proliferated.2
The use of these devices to regulate change in land use patterns previously established by zoning ordinances 3 has given rise to due process
1. Popular participation is facilitated by the availability of two devices: the initiative and the referendum. The initiative permits citizens to legislate directly by having
a proposed measure placed on the ballot and submitted to a popular vote. The referendum permits citizens to have measures already approved by a legislative body submitted
to voter review. The operation of these devices is usually conditioned on the receipt
of appropriate petitions requesting the particular initiative or referendum. Comment,
The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 74 nn.1 & 2
(1976).
2. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290
(1968); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d

570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976); Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 41 Cal. App. 3d 677, 116 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Ct. App.
1974); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
3. Land use restrictions imposed by a local zoning ordinance can be altered by
the use of three procedures. When the application of zoning restrictions to a particular
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challenges attacking such popular participation as an arbitrary and
unreasonable

exercise of the police power.

The United States

Supreme Court had not addressed itself to this issue in almost fifty
years,4 and its early decisions did not provide a meaningful due process
test. In Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,Inc.5 the Court confronted

the question whether the imposition of a mandatory" referendum process on those seeking amendment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance
was such an unreasonable exercise. 7 In upholding the referendum requirement by relying on state law and by reciting rather than analyzing
the relevant federal precedent, the Court failed to provide a more precise due process measure of constitutionality. The decision strongly
suggests, however, that rezoning by referendum will be upheld against
similar future challenges, even when there is little or no support in the
record to justify community-wide decisionmaking.
Plaintiff8 in Eastlake brought suit in the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas to challenge the constitutionality 9 of a newly enacted provision
parcel is unusually harsh, a variance may be obtained from a local administrative body
to waive or alter the restriction. 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAw § 129.02
(1975). Also, a local ordinance may provide that certain uses, while not permitted as
of right, may be allowed by special permit upon the approval of a local administrative
body. The administrative body must evaluate the proposal according to specified criteria
not necessarily related to hardship. Id. § 148.01. In addition, the zoning ordinance
itself may be amended. Id. § 147.01. The initiative and referendum cannot be utilized
to affect the availability of variances or special permits. The grant or denial of a request for a variance or special permit is an administrative act; the initiative and referendum are restricted in application to powers vested in the legislative body. See, e.g., note
20 infra.
4. Until this year, the Court's most recent statement was to be found in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
5. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
6. The referendum provision involved in Eastlake is atypical in that the requirement of voter review is applied to an entire class of legislation, thereby obviating the
need for gathering petitions to combat a legislatively approved amendment. See note
12 infra.
7. 96 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The court below stated the claim as follows: "[A]ppellant's narrow claim is that Eastlake's charter provision constitutes a delegation of legislative power to the people, and as such violates the requirement that the police powers
be exercised in a reasonable and unarbitrary fashion." Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v.
City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 191, 324 N.E.2d 740, 744 (1975) (emphasis
added).
8. Plaintiff was an Ohio corporation and the owner of an eight acre parcel of
land situated in the city of Eastlake, Ohio. 96 S. Ct. at 2360.
9. Challenges were made on both state and federal constitutional grounds. In addition to the fourteenth amendment claim, plaintiff asserted that the ordinance was in
violation of the referendum provisions of OHIo CONST. of 1851, art. II, § 1(f) (1912).
Plaintiff also challenged the requirement of 55% voter approval, the requirement of
having to bear the costs of the referendum, and the applicability of the referendum provision (which had been incorporated into the city charter only after its application for
rezoning) to his request. 96 S. Ct. at 2361 nn.2-4.
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of the Eastlake city charter'" that required that plaintiffs request for
rezoning" its property be submitted to a city-wide referendum after city

council approval of the proposed change. 12 Both the court of common
pleas and the Ohio Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the ordinance against the due process challenge. 3

The Ohio Supreme Court reversed. After finding that the type
of rezoning requested by plaintiff was a legislative function under Ohio

law, 14 the court interpreted a line of United States Supreme Court due
process cases from the early 1900's

5

-to mean that "[a] reasonable use

of property, made possible by appropriate legislative action, may not
be made dependent upon the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable

whims of the voting public."' Applying this test, the court found that
the charter provision "blatantly delegated legislative authority"'-7 in
contravention of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 8
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,' 9 up-

holding the constitutionality of the charter provision on three grounds.
10.

EASTLAKE,

OHIO CHARTER art. VIII, § 3 (1971), quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2368

n.8.
11. Plaintiff had requested that its parcel be rezoned from industrial to multifamily, high-rise residential use. 96 S. Ct. at 2360; 41 Ohio St. 2d at 187, 324 N.E.2d
at 742.
12. The new ordinance provides in pertinent part:
[Any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance, or the enactment of any ordinance referring to other regulations controlling the development of land . . . cannot be approved unless and until it
shall have been submitted to the Planning Commission, for approval or disapproval. That in the event the city council should approve any of the preceding
changes, or enactments . . . it shall not be approved or passed by the declaration of an emergency, and it shall not be effective, but it shall be mandatory
that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of the
qualified electors of the City of Eastlake ....
96 S. Ct. at 2368 n.8.
13. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 188, 324 N.E.2d at 742. The Court of Common Pleas struck
the cost-bearing provision. Defendant did not appeal this holding to the state supreme
court, and plaintiff did not appeal the rejection of its contention that the ordinance could
not be applied to its particular request. Id.
14. Id. at 189-90, 324 N.E.2d at 743.
15. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). The latter two are discussed in text accompanying notes
31-42 infra.
16. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
17. Id. at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
18. Assuming that the Ohio Supreme Court properly interpreted the due process
line of cases cited in note 15 supra, the result it reached does not necessarily follow.
Since the charter had been amended before the city council approved plaintiff's rezoning
proposal, it is arguable that the council action never "made possible" the land use proposed, but rather that it only "made possible" the necessity of a referendum.
19. Justices Brennan, Powell and Stevens dissented.
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First, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, interpreted the

Ohio Constitution as reserving, rather than delegating, to the citizens of Ohio the referendum power over legislative affairs. 20 There
having been no delegation of power, the Court reasoned, there was no
delegation in violation of the due process clause. 2 Second, the Court
accepted as binding for the purpose of its due .process analysis the

finding of the Ohio court that the rezoning process at bar was legislative
in nature 22 and summarily concluded that the only due process doctrine
available to plaintiff was that of freedom from an unreasonable zoning
classification, as opposed to freedom from an unreasonable procedure
for obtaining a (new) classification.2 Finally, the Court distinguished
the "standardless delegation of power" struck down in the due process
cases relied on by the Ohio court from the Eastlake referendum process
and its concomitant virtues. 4 While borrowing language from two
recent federal decisions 25 to support this latter distinction, the Court
failed to provide any factual analysis to demonstrate comparability between the case at bar and the cases it cited.

In dissent, Justice Stevens 20 ignored the delegation of power issue
entirely, arguing instead that the decision whether to rezone 27 a particular parcel of land is, absent some evidence in the record of a potential for community-wide impact, adjudicative in nature.2 8 He
20. OHIO CONsT. art. II, § l(f) provides in part: 'The initiative and referendum
are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such municipality may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action
21. 96 S. Ct. at 2363. Although the language of art. II, § l(f), quoted in note
20 supra, does suggest this interpretation, see Note, Mandatory Referendum for Zoning
Amendments-Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power-Denial of Due Process, 9
AxRON L. REv. 175, 183 (1975), it is arguable that the Ohio Supreme Court implicitly
rejected this conclusion in its finding that a delegation had occurred. 41 Ohio St. 2d
at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
22. 96 S.Ct. at 2362.
23. Id. at 2363 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
24. 96 S.Ct. at 2364-65.
25. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). The latter is discussed in text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
26. Justice Brennan joined with Justice Stevens in dissent. Justice Powell wrote
a separate dissenting opinion.
27. Both Justice Stevens and the Chief Justice relied heavily on state court decisions to support their respective legislative/non-legislative dichotomies. 96 S. Ct. at
2362, 2366, 2370. The significant distinction between the two views is that Justice
Stevens would categorize according to the prospective impact of the rezoning, id. at 2371,
while Chief Justice Burger would take a formalistic approach, adopting as controlling
the state law determination, id. at 2362.
28. "I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum as an
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asserted that this conclusion should result regardless of the "legislative"
label affixed to the activity by the state court. 29 Justice Stevens concluded that as an adjudicative mechanism, the referendum is an inappropriate device for disposition of the rezoning request because of its
inherent inability to afford the applicant requisite procedural
safeguards.a0
Plaintiff's due process claim arose out of a line of Supreme Court
cases starting with Eubank v. City of Richmond.3 In Eubank the
Court invalidated a city ordinance that permitted a limited number of
neighboring property owners to mandate, by petition, the establishment
of a building line, a line beyond which the owner could not build, on
a specific parcel. 32 The unreasonableness of the ordinance, the Court
found, rested in the ability of a few persons to exercise unchecked
"control" over the property rights of another, control that might be
occasioned by selfishness or whimsy.3" The transfer of land use
planning authority to area residents was thus stricken because of the
small number of residents who could selfishly impose restrictions-an
arrangement that has been disparagingly termed "an expression of
neighborhood preference for restraints."34
Five years after Eubank, the Court decided Thomas Cusack Co.
v. City of Chicago," which added another dimension to the due process
analysis. In Cusack the Court upheld a city ordinance that permitted
a percentage of neighboring property owners to waive a billboard ban
previously imposed by another provision of that ordinance.36 Responding to plaintiff's assertion that Eubank was controlling precedent,
the Court distinguished the neighborhood imposition of land use prohibitions from the neighborhood removal (or waiver) of such prohibitions."
appropriate method of deciding questions of community policy. I think it is equally
clear that the popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of individual litigants." Id. at 2371.
29. Id. at 2368.
30. These safeguards include a resolution "on the merits by reference to articulable
rules" as well as an "impartial and qualified" decisionmaker. Id. at 2371.
31. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id. at 144.

34. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294
(9th Cir. 1970).
35. 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
36. Id. at 527-28.
37. The former left the establishment of the building line untouched until the
lot owners should act and then made the street committee the mere automatic
register of that action and gave to it the effect of law. The ordinance in the
case at bar absolutely prohibits the erection of billboards . . . but permits this
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After Cusack then, both the nature of popular participationwaiver or imposition of restraints-and the number of persons allowed
to participate are relevant due process concerns. Substantial tension
exists, however, between these two factors. While the Eubank Court
decried the potential for selfishness under the building line ordinance,
the Cusack Court in upholding the billboard ordinance allowed such
selfishness to prevail.3 8 Furthermore, the ordinance in Eubank was
viewed as an unreasonable exercise of the city's police power in part
because of the city-wide inconsistency in land use policy that would
result. 9 There is nothing to suggest less inconsistent results from the
exercise of neighborhood power under the Cusack procedure.
Cusack may be seen as the pivotal case on the due process issue

raised in Eastlake. To the extent that the imposition-waiver distinction
drawn in Cusack is still good law,40 it could be dispositive, since
plaintiff in Eastlake, like plaintiff in Cusack, was arguably requesting
the removal of a prohibition. 41 To the extent, however, that the
Cusack Court contradicted Eubank by endorsing neighborhood land use
policy-making because neighbors are those most affected, it suggests
that a referendum on such a localized issue would be uniquely inappropriate: negotiation is impracticable and those who are affected in
fact may not be able to control the decision.42
The vitality of Eubank and Cusack, however, has been drawn into
question by another line of Supreme Court cases that applied the
prohibition to be modified with the consent of the persons who are to be most
affected by such modification . . . . This is not a delegation of legislative
power, but is . . . a familiar provision affecting the enforcement of laws and
ordinances.
Id. at 531.
38. The concession by the Court that some land use planning decisions are most
appropriately handled on an informal, neighborhood basis suggests that Eubank was
wrongly decided. In both cases the relevant statutory schemes may be seen as providing
a legal framework within which neighborhood negotiation may take place. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 709-10 (1973).
39. 226 U.S. at 144.
40. At least one commentator has questioned the vitality of the Cusack holding.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 98-99. See also text accompanying notes 43-54 infra.
41. See note 18 supra.
42. Both the Ohio and United States Supreme Courts included Washington ex rel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), in the line of early due process
cases. Although both courts treated Roberge, in essence, as an affirmance of the Eubank decision, it is questionable whether the R6berge Court believed itself to be confronted with a similar due process issue. The zoning ordinance challenged by plaintiff
in Roberge was struck down as a denial of due process. 278 U.S. at 122 (citing Eubank). In support of its statement that the ordinance permits constitutionally infirm
motives to enter into neighborhood decisionmaking, however, the Court relied on Yick
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former decisions in analyzing due process challenges to congressional
delegations of authority. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 48 the Court,
citing Eubank as primary authority, 44 struck down as an unlawful dele-

gation of legislative authority an act45 that gave a portion of the employers and employees in a single industry and in a defined district
unchecked authority to set wage and hour standards for the entire industry in that district by vote. 46 The administrative authority with
oversight responsibility was required to accept -the resulting standards.4 7
Three years later, in Currin v. Wallace,48 the Court, citing Cusack,

upheld an act 49 that also required industry participation in the regulatory process, but that permitted referendum proceedings on specific

decisions only after they were approved by the administrative authority.5"

The Court dismissed Carter as precedent, stating: "This is not

a case where a group of producers may make a law and enforce it upon
a minority . . ...51 In likening the Currin scheme for participation
to the scheme involved in Cusack, the Court attempted to distinguish
the Carter provisions on the basis of Cusack's imposition-waiver
dichotomy.5 2- But this distinction is unpersuasive since industry partici-

pation was related to imposing restraints on the subject industry in both
Carter and Currin. Rather, the difference rests in the control by the

administrative authority of the alternatives that may be selected by industry vote. In Currin, unlike Carter, industry participation is limited to
the approval of alternatives previously adjudged to be reasonable. 52
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The ordinance struck down in Yick Wo was held
invalid on equal protection grounds. 118 U.S. at 374. That the Court in Roberge was
in actuality concerned with the particularly harsh treatment accorded the plaintiff is further borne out by the language of the ordinance, which appears to single out plaintiff's
particular use for harsher treatment than other uses with which it was grouped before
the ordinance was amended. 278 U.S. at 120 (footnote).
43. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
44. Id. at 311-12.
45. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, ch. 824, sec. 4, 49 Stat. 991 (1935). One
purpose of this Act was to "stabilize the . . . industry and promote its interstate commerce . . ." 298 U.S. at 278.
46. Id. at 283-84.
47. Id.
48. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
49. Tobacco Inspection Act, ch. 623, sec. 5, 49 Stat. 731 (1935) (current version
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 511-517 (1970)). This Act was designed to bring stability into the interstate tobacco market and thereby protect producers. The Act conferred on the Secretary
of Agriculture the power to designate warehouses for tobacco inspection. 306 U.S. at
5-6.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Id. at 15-16.
52. Id. at 15; see text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
53. Cf. McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928
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These cases suggest an alternative to the imposition-waiver due
process analysis of Cusack: a "supervised participation," under which
popular participation in land use planning is acceptable, even if use restraints result, as long as it is controlled to insure that the decisions
reached are consistent with an externally established policy. The
Eastlake case provided the Supreme Court with an excellent opportunity to rule on the applicability of supervised participation as an alternative due process approach in the area of land use decisionmaking and
to delimit the minimum acceptable standards for such practices. 4
In recent years the Supreme Court has twice considered the
constitutionality of mandatory referenda.5 Since both cases involved
equal protection challenges, however, the Court, while speaking favorably
of the referendum as a land use planning device, has not been required to
confront squarely the due process claim raised by plaintiff in Eastlake.
A similar claim did confront the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization [SASSO] v. Union

City."6 In SASSO plaintiffs challenged a permissive 7 referendum
that nullified the rezoning of a parcel that would have permitted the
construction of federally financed low income housing. 8 The circuit court upheld the validity of the nullifying referendum,59 dis-

tinguishing in broad terms the referendum process from the neighborhood preference cases.00 The court thus adopted the Eubank due proc(1961) (administrative authority to disapprove agreements made between industry members).
54. Eastlake provides an excellent test case. Under the ordinance, referenda do
not occur until the city council has approved the request; there is thus found the element
of supervision. Council control is limited, however, because the ordinance does not pro.
vide for relief from the referendum process when the present zoning status of the parcel
has become unreasonable due to changed circumstances. Therefore it is not within the
council's supervisory powers to prevent a referendum from defeating what it believes to
be a constitutionally compelled approval of a rezoning request. 96 S. Ct. at 2363; see
note 12 supra. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Spaulding v.
Blair, 403 F.2d 862, 864 (4th Cir. 1968).
55. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969); see text accompanying notes 74-78 infra.
56. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
57. A permissive referendum, unlike its mandatory counterpart, requires the presentation of a petition, signed by a specified number of qualified persons, for each specific
issue on which a referendum is desired. See, e.g., id. at 293 n.3. There may be significant differences in terms of due process between a permissive and a mandatory referendum procedure. See Comment, supra note 1, at 98. This distinction, however, was
overlooked by the Supreme Court in the Eastlake decision.
58. 424 F.2d at 291.
59. Appellants in SASSO also mounted an unsuccessful equal protection challenge
to the referendum. Id. at 295-96.
60. Id. at 294.
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ess measure-the number of persons participating-but ignored the
Cusack waiver-imposition distinction as well as the supervised partici-

pation approach from the Carter and Currin cases, under either of
which the permissive referendum might not have fared so well.6
Against this backdrop of multiple, and arguably conflicting, due
process tests for the constitutionality of direct citizen participation in
land use planning, the majority opinion in Eastlake is analytically

inconclusive.

Chief Justice Burger placed primary reliance on his

interpretation of the Ohio Constitution to dispose of the Ohio Supreme

Court's contention that an unlawful delegation occured under the
Eastlake ordinance. 62

This interpretation provided the Court with a

vehicle for disposing of the case without delimiting the utility or
vitality of the various available due process tests.
The concept of supervised participation was the first test with
which the Court attempted to deal. Responding to the Ohio Supreme
Court's contention

that the ordinance

provided for inadequate

legislative (council) control, 63 Chief Justice Burger did take note of
federal court decisions concerned with congressional delegations to
other authorities.6 4 However, the cases to which he turned did not

involve statutory requirements that make the implementation of policy
decisions subject to approval by non-governmental persons, as was the

case in Currin. Rather, the cases cited dealt more narrowly with the
ability of the delegate itself to prescribe policy within definable
boundaries. 65

The majority, however, did provide more relevant commentary
that evinces a pessimistic perspective on the quality of legislative super-

vision that would ensue, were such supervision required. Stating that
requiring supervision as a matter of due process "sweeps too broadly"
because the legislative body and the voters are equally likely to misapply or ignore appropriate standards,66 the Court appears to have elimi61. Since a permissive referendum is not operative until after the rezoning request
is granted, it is more clearly an attempt to (re-)impose a land use restraint than a referendum that is attached by statute to any rezoning approval. See note 18 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
63. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 324
N.E.2d 740, 746 (1975).
64. 96 S. Ct. at 2363 (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)).
65. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419-20 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 743, 746-47 (D.D.C. 1971).
66. "Except as a legislative history informs an analysis of legislative action, there
is no more advance assurance that a legislative body will act by conscientiously applying
consistent standards than there is with respect to voters." 96 S. Ct. at 2363 n.10.
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nated the very rationale relied on by the 1939 Court in distinguishing
7
the Currin procedure from that held unconstitutional in Carter.
Furthermore, since the Currin facts suggested judicial approval of the
supervised imposition of restraints, the apparent removal of the supervision requirement with respect to a city-wide referendum procedure
suggests that neither the imposition nor the waiver of land use
restraints by referendum is constitutionally infirm. That is to say, the
imposition-waiver distinction drawn in Cusack is overruled. 8
The Court, however, did not overrule Cusack. Instead, the imposition-waiver distinction was recited,69 with Chief Justice Burger concluding that plaintiff in Eastlake, like plaintiff in Cusack, was seeking
the waiver of a preexisting restraint: "No existing rights are being
impaired; new use rights are being sought from the City Council.
Thus, this case involves an owner seeking approval of a new use free
from the restrictions attached to the land when it was acquired.""0
Cusack, however, did not approve of referenda as appropriate devices
for the removal of land use restraints, but only of neighborhood
decisionmaking by "the persons who are to be most affected by such
modification." 7' Acceptance of the Cusack holding in toto, therefore,
would seemingly require that the Eubank criticism of "narrow" delegations (i.e., neighborhood preferences) be held inapplicable to the
Eastlake facts.
Instead, the majority distinguished -the Eubank neighborhood pref2
erence concept in upholding the Eastlake referendum procedure.7
The Court thus ignored not only the imposition-waiver distinction it had
just drawn from Cusack, but also the interrelationship of the Eubank
and Cusack rationales.
In support of the neighborhood preference-referendum dichotomy
that it invoked from Eubank (despite the contrary language in Cusack),
67. See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 2364 n.12; see text accompanying nole 37 supra.
70. 96 S. Ct. at 2364 n.13. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens implicitly
attacked the vitality of Cusack by arguing that the requirements of due process attach
to the rezoning process with equal force whether additional restraint or additional freedom is at issue. Id. at 2367. See also Note, Zoning-Due Process-The Adjudicative
Decision Inherent in Tract Rezoning Requires the Decision-Maker to Adhere to Standards of Minimal Due Process, 8 GA. L. REv. 254, 262 (1973).
71. 242 U.S. at 531; see note 38 supra.
72. "Mhe standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners
condemned by the Court in Eubank and Roberge is not to be equated with decisionmaking by the people through the referendum process." 96 S. Ct. at 2364.
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the Court quoted first from SASSO, 73 and then from James v. Valtierra7 4
the latter as a confirmation by the Court of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision in SASSO. 7 5 In Valtierra, the United States Supreme Court upheld a provision of the California Constitution that
required a referendum on all proposed low rent public housing projects.7 6 However, the Eastlake Court's reliance on Valtierra is inappropriate, because plaintiffs in Valtierra challenged the California
provision on equal protection, not due process, grounds. Furthermore,
in so construing the Valtierra opinion the Court overlooked two important distinctions between the facts of Eastlake on the one hand and
Valtierra on the other. The language in the latter case approving
community-wide policy making was supported by a record demonstrating that the rezoning would have an economic impact on the community at large.7 7 Furthermore, the mandatory referendum procedure
challenged in Valtierrawas limited to a certain class of projects.7" The
scope of the impact of plaintiff's rezoning request in Eastlake was not
similarly supported in the record. 9 In addition, the Eastlake procedure
was applicable to all requests for rezoning by amendment of the comprehensive plan."
The majority nevertheless concluded that plaintiff's particular rezoning request "would likely" have an impact similar to that held
However, the Court
sufficient to sustain the Valtierra referendum."
neither explicitly required such a finding nor limited the operation of
the referendum procedure to instances in which such a finding could
be made.8 2 The result is a circular due process analysis suggesting a
judicial reverence not heretofore apparent for the use of referenda in
land use planning: the referendum is held superior to the neighborhood preference concept because it provides for community-wide
73. "'A referendum, however, is far more than an expression of ambiguously
founded neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters
'" Id. (quoting Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d
.
291,294 (9th Cir. 1970)).
74. A referendum "'ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice
in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for in96 S. Ct. at 2364 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
creased public services .... .'
137, 143 (1971)) (emphasis added by Court).
75. See note 73 supra.

76.
77.
78.
79.

402 U.S. 137, 139 &n.2 (1971).
Id. at 143 n.4.
Id. at 139 n.2.
96 S. Ct. at 2368 n.10 (dissent).

80. See note 12 supra.

81. 96 S. Ct. at 2362 n.7; see Note, supranote 21, at 178.
82. 96 S. Ct. at 2371 (dissent).
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policy making, and since community-wide policy making is involved, the
referendum is an appropriate device.
The missing logical step-that the particular question at hand is
one amenable to community-wide policy making-is provided, the
Court reasoned, by the Ohio court's determination that rezoning by
amendment is "legislative" in nature.8 3 This adherence to the label
affixed by the state court was attacked by Justice Stevens as an abrogation of the Court's responsibility to pursue an independent analysis
of the application of federal constitutional safeguards. 4 Ithas been
suggested by others that the labelling of rezoning requests as "legislative," "administrative" or "adjudicative" by state courts is a matter
of form that does not correspond with either the prospective impact
of the requested rezoning or the kinds of information to which the decisionmaker should be exposed. 85 Indeed, the Court's reluctance to ignore
the legislative label appears to be contrary to accepted methods of due
process analysis in other contexts: "In the assessment, apportionment
and collection of taxes upon property within their jurisdiction the
Constitution of the United States imposes few restrictions upon the
States. In the enforcement of such restrictionsas the Constitution does
impose this court has regarded substance and not form."8 6 The failure
of the Court in Eastlake similarly to disregard form and analyze the
primary activity involved, i.e., rezoning by amendment of a comprehensive plan, leaves the protection afforded to individual property
owners by the due process clause wholly dependent on the formalities
of state zoning law.
The reluctance of the Court to come to grips with the due process
problems associated with the use of mandatory referenda in land use
planning is disappointing for two reasons. First, the Eastlake opinion
leaves open the possibility of subsequent litigation of the same due
process issue, particularly if the claim arises in a state whose constitution will not provide the judicial refuge so readily accepted in this
case. Second, counsel who relitigate the Eastlake due process issue
83. Id. at 2362.
84. Id. at 2368 (dissent).
85. See Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 130, 133 (1972). See generally Comment, supra note 1.
86. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) (emphasis added). For examples of similar analyses that look to the substance of the activity in question, see BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915); Powelton
Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
901 (1974).
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must again contend with the conflicting case law, having received little
guidance from the Court.
Such litigation, however, may be ill advised. In failing to provide
a clearer due process approach, the Court has left unscathed the separate due process tests already enumerated. In the broad approval of
the Eastlake procedure by comparison to the procedure upheld in
Valtierra, the Court has strongly suggested that, if required, one or
more of the tests will be utilized to defeat such a challenge.
Litigation resources may be more fruitfully expended by challenging such referenda on state law grounds. One approach would be
to challenge the characterization of rezoning by plan amendment as
legislative. If a different characterization is adopted by the state court,
the state constitution may prohibit the application of referenda. Alternatively, referenda may be attacked as contrary to the spirit of consistent decisionmaking, if not the letter of procedural requirements,
87
found in state zoning enabling legislation.
If federal law is to be invoked, the issue may perhaps be framed
more appropriately in terms of the deprivation of a meaningful hearing
when a referendum is required, rather than in terms of the reasonableness of the referendum provision as an exercise of the police power.
It must be noted, however, that a Supreme Court majority recently
decided not to hear an appeal in one case" that would have challenged
rezoning by initiative as a denial of such procedural due process requirements.89 Nevertheless, Justice White's desire to hear that appeal,
together with the frequent allusions of the three dissenting Justices in
Eastlake to deprivations of "fundamental fairness" and especially with
the willingness of Justices Stevens and Brennan to declare tract rezoning
an adjudicative function on federal law grounds, suggests that at least
four members of the Court may be willing to reconsider a procedural
due process claim when an appropriate case arises.
JAMES

H.

GUTERMAN

87. See, e.g., Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 525-26, 312 A.2d
154, 157-58 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Elkind v. City of New Rochelle, 5 Misc. 2d
296, 301-02, 163 N.Y.S.2d 870, 876-77 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 5
N.Y.2d 836, 181 N.Y.S.2d 509, 155 N.E.2d 404 (1958). But see Johnston v. City of
Claremont, 312 P.2d 300, 304-05 (1957), vacated on other grounds, 49 Cal. 2d 826,
323 P.2d 71 (1958). See generally authorities cited note 85 supra.
88. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d

570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976)

(Brennan,

White, JJ., dissenting).

89. See 44 U.S.L.W. 3042 (1975)
the Court).
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